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IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AND THE HEARSAY RULE
Richard B. Kuhns*
It is heartening to know that misunderstanding hearsay is not an exclusively
American phenomenon.' For example, in Regina v. Kearley,2 the issue before the
House of Lords was whether the defendant was a drug dealer. To help establish
this fact the prosecution had introduced testimony of police officers that various
individuals who visited and telephoned the defendant's premises following his
arrest had asked to purchase drugs.3 The three Lord majority characterized these
out-of-court statements as inadmissible hearsay.4 At the same time, however,
they argued that similar evidence of a telephone caller's out-of-court statement in
Ratten v. Regina5 was not hearsay. In the latter case, the defendant claimed that
the fatal shooting of his wife was an accident.6 To rebut this claim the prosecutor
introduced evidence that moments before her death, the wife made a sobbing,
hysterical telephone request for help from the police.7
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. I suspect that some of my colleagues - particularly those who believe that the evidence in Wright v.
Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837), should be classified as hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence
- will dismiss this implied assertion as unreliable hearsay.
2. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
3. Id. at 236.
4. Id. at 251 (Bridge); id. at 258 (Ackner); id. at 276 (Oliver).
5. 3 All E.R. 801 (P.C. 1971).
6. Id. at 803.
7. The positions of the three Lords in the majority were a bit more complex than the text suggests. Lord
Bridge argued that:
the making of the telephone call was unquestionably relevant and the words spoken were admissible
both on the ground that they were part of the "composite act" [?] of the call itself and as evidence of
the wife's emotional state, but not as implying an assertion that she was being attacked by the
accused.
Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 246 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
Lord Ackner reached a similar conclusion but suggested that the evidence may be admissible as part of the
res gestae:
I cannot accept that it would have been permissible to tender the contents of the phone call as con-
taining an implied assertion that the deceased was being attacked by her husband, and thus a permis-
sible exception to the hearsay rule. That her request was part of the res gestae, another ground upon
which the evidence was admitted ... raises quite a different point.
Id. at 258.
Lord Oliver, the third Lord in the Kearley majority, was more specific about the possibility of using a
hearsay exception to admit the evidence in Ratten:
(The telephone call] was held to be rightly admitted as evidence simply of a telephone call made by
a lady in a distressed state made at a time when the accused denied that any call was made and in the
context of his contention that the shooting was accidental. It is to be noted, however, that in so far as
it was admissible as evidence from which the jury could be invited to infer that the caller was being
attacked by her husband, the Board found it admissible only as part of the res gestae, ie [sic] as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 261.
To the extent that these excerpts suggest that the Ratten evidence, if hearsay, is admissible pursuant to an
exception to the hearsay rule, they are consistent with the position I take in this Essay. The thrust of each
excerpt, however, seems to be that the evidence is admissible because it is not hearsay in the first place. That
proposition is sound, as the Lords suggest, only if the evidence is offered to prove whether the victim made a
telephone call or what the victim's state of mind was. The victim's state of mind, however, is irrelevant (except
to the extent that one infers what caused that state of mind). The fact that a victim made a telephone call is
irrelevant except to contradict the defendant's testimony that there was not a call. For this limited impeachment
purpose there is no need to reveal the content of the wife's statement.
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If the characterization of the Kearley evidence as hearsay is correct, the Ratten
evidence should also be hearsay. Moreover, even if one accepts the position of
the Kearley dissenters that the Kearley evidence is not hearsay, one can make a
plausible argument that the Ratten evidence is hearsay. In other words, between
Kearley and Ratten, the stronger candidate for hearsay classification is Ratten. It
may well be, however, that the evidence in Ratten should be admissible, at least
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, regardless of the hearsay classification.
In this Essay I will first discuss briefly the rationale for the hearsay rule and
point out the common hearsay-type characteristics of the evidence in Kearley and
Ratten. I will then address the question whether assertions like those in Kearley
and Ratten should be classified as hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Finally, I will suggest that many Kearley-Ratten-type assertions, if they are clas-
sified as hearsay, should be admissible as spontaneous declarations.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.8 The principal rationale for excluding hearsay evi-
dence is the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant to test the
strength of two inferences: (1) that the declarant honestly believes what the
statement appears to assert and (2) that the declarant's belief is an accurate
reflection of the fact asserted.' I will refer to these inferences as the hearsay
inferences.10
The first hearsay inference will be incorrect if the declarant is not being sin-
cere or if the factfinder, upon hearing the statement, draws an incorrect inference
about a sincere declarant's belief.11 Such an incorrect inference could result from
the declarant's inadvertent slip of the tongue, or it could result from the factfind-
er's misinterpretation of an ambiguous word or phrase. 2 The second hearsay
inference will be incorrect if the declarant misperceived the events related in the
statement or if the declarant, at the time of the statement, did not accurately
remember the events. 3 I will refer to insincerity, improper narration, ambiguity,
misperception, and poor memory as the hearsay problems or dangers.14
8. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
9. Some out-of-court declarations require the factfinder to make only the first hearsay inference. Consider,
for example, a will contest case in which Harold, one of three sons and the sole beneficiary under his father's
will, is trying to rebut a claim that he exercised undue influence over the testator. Harold offers the testimony
of witnesses to the effect that long before the alleged undue influence the testator said, "Harold is the finest of
my sons" or "I prefer Harold over my other sons." See McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
591 (2d ed. Cleary, 1972). Evidence of this type may sometimes be classified as hearsay. See id. See also
RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KustNs, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 344-47 (1989). The classifi-
cation, however, is purely academic, for all such evidence classified as hearsay falls within the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EvIn. 803(3). As a result, the hearsay rule is never a bar to the
admissibility of this type of evidence. Thus, there is no need to consider whether implied assertions that impli-
cate only the first of the two hearsay inferences should be classified as hearsay.
10. For elaborations on the inferential process involved in assessing hearsay evidence, see, e.g., ALLEN &
KuRNS, supra note 9, at 295-302; Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HAR. L. RE. 957 (1974).
11. ALLEN & KuHNs, supra note 9, at 295-96.
12.. ALLEN & Kum.Ns, supra note 9, at 295-96.
13. ALLEN & KuHNs, supra note 9, at 296.
14. Forcing the hearsay declarant to testify and be subject to cross-examination will not necessarily expose
the hearsay dangers. Nonetheless, in the context of the adversary system cross-examination is an important
means of trying to assess the strength or weakness of the hearsay inferences.
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Despite the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay declarant,
the hearsay rule does not exclude statements falling within an exception to the
hearsay rule."5 The rationale for most hearsay exceptions is that one or more of
the hearsay dangers is not likely to be present.
Both Kearley and Ratten involve implied assertions - statements (1) that
imply (but do not explicitly assert) the proposition that the proponent wishes the
factfinder to draw from the evidence and (2) that require the factfinder to make
the same inferences that a factfinder would have to make if the statement had
been an explicit hearsay assertion. Thus, in Kearley, the relevance of the evi-
dence depends on inferring that the callers and visitors believed the defendant
was selling drugs and, further, that this belief was accurate. If the declarants had
directly asserted that the defendant was selling drugs, one would have to make
the same inferences, and the evidence would unquestionably be hearsay.
Similarly, in Ratten, the relevance of the evidence depends on inferring that the
wife was afraid of her husband and that this fear had an accurate factual basis. If
the wife had said, "My husband is threatening me with a shotgun," one would
have to make the same inferences, and the evidence would unquestionably be
hearsay.1
In addition to being analytically similar to explicit hearsay statements, implied
assertions are also sometimes analytically even more similar to nonassertive non-
verbal conduct, which many evidence codes (including the Federal Rules of
Evidence) exempt from the definition of hearsay. In a jurisdiction that treats
nonassertive nonverbal conduct as non-hearsay, the key to understanding whether
an implied assertion should be classified as hearsay lies in analyzing the relation-
ship between implied assertions and nonassertive nonverbal conduct.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) provides that nonverbal conduct is a hearsay
statement only if the actor intends it as an assertion. 7 Thus, for example, if a
police officer asked which way the assailant fled and if the victim pointed north,
testimony about the pointing to prove which way the assailant fled would be
hearsay. The victim intended the nonverbal conduct as a substitute for an oral
assertion. Whether the victim pointed or made an oral stateient, the hearsay
inferences are the same: The factfinder, to credit the evidence, must infer (1)
that the victim believed that the defendant fled to the north and (2) that this
belief is an accurate reflection of what happened.
15. ALLEN & KuNs, supra note 9, at 300.
16. A cry for help that does not identify the source of the difficulty creates an ambiguity problem not pre-
sent in the direct hearsay assertion that names the husband: perhaps some third person or even some nonhuman
force was creating the danger. In some instances independent evidence will be available to minimize this ambi-
guity problem. For example, in Ratten, where the defendant admitted shooting his wife but claimed that it was
an accident, there appears to be no question about whether some person or thing other than the husband could
have been putting the wife in danger.
17. See FED. R. Evm. 801(a), (c). Subdivision (c) defines hearsay as a "statement ... offered ... to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Subdivision (a) defines "statement" as "(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." FED. R.
EviD. 801 (a) (emphasis added).
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Frequently out-of-court nonverbal conduct is nonassertive and therefore, by
definition, not hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence. A classic example
of this type of evidence is the sea captain hypothetical set forth in Wright v.
Tatham:18 To prove that a ship is seaworthy, a witness offers to testify that the
captain inspected the ship and then embarked on it with his spouse and chil-
dren.19 The relevance of the evidence requires the factfinder to make the same
hearsay inferences that the factfinder must make with the evidence of the vic-
tim's pointing. From the captain's activity the factfinder must infer (1) that the
captain believed the ship was seaworthy and further (2) that this belief reflected
the actual condition of the ship. These inferences, however, may be incorrect. If
the captain knew that somebody was watching, the captain may have been trying
to create a false impression that the ship is seaworthy (insincerity); the captain
may have realized that the ship was not seaworthy but nonetheless decided to risk
the voyage, perhaps because of a medical emergency (ambiguity); the captain
may not have seen that the ship was leaking badly (misperception); and if there
was a time lapse between the inspection and the embarking, the captain may have
forgotten how unseaworthy the ship was (poor memory).
There is, however, one significant difference between the sea captain's activity
and the pointing activity. Whereas the pointing victim was almost certainly
intending to assert the proposition that the assailant fled to the north, it is
extremely unlikely that the sea captain was intending to assert that the ship was
seaworthy. To the extent that one can be confident that the sea captain was not
intending to assert or communicate anything about the seaworthiness of the ship,
one can be confident that the sea captain was not being insincere. Because the
apparently nonassertive nature of the conduct has eliminated the problem of
18. 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516 (K.B. 1837).
19. Id.
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insincerity, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence chose to exempt this
type of activity from the definition of hearsay.20
Sometimes when a party offers evidence of out-of-court verbal activity, the rel-
evance of which depends on both hearsay inferences, there will appear to be a
very tenuous relationship between what the declarant apparently intended to
assert and the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. When this is the
case, the absence of an intent to assert the proposition for which the evidence is
being offered makes the evidence functionally almost identical to nonassertive
nonverbal conduct. 1
Consider, for example, Wright v. Tatham,22 where the question was the admissi-
bility of letters written to a testator, Marsden, to show that he was competent.
Both hearsay inferences and the hearsay dangers associated with them are theo-
retically present. The factfinder must infer that the letter writers believed
Marsden was competent. Perhaps they knew he was incompetent and just want-
ed to bolster his spirits (ambiguity), or perhaps they were trying to deceive peo-
20. See FED. R. EVID. 80 1(a) advisory committee's note (citations omitted):
Some nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is clearly the
equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement. Other nonverbal conduct,
however, may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the exis-
tence of the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may be
inferred. This sequence is, arguably, in effect an assertion of the evidence of the condition and
hence properly includable within the hearsay concept. Admittedly evidence of this character is
untested with respect to the perception, memory and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but
the Advisory Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to
assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class of evidence is free of
the possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal con-
duct. The situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate questions
of sincerity. Motivation, the nature of the conduct, and the presence or absence of reliance will bear
heavily upon the weight to be given the evidence.
There are a number of arguments that one might make against the decision to exempt nonassertive nonverbal
conduct from the definition of hearsay. For example, one might be mistaken in any given case about whether
the conduct really is nonassertive. Even if the conduct is nonassertive, the nonassertive nature of the conduct,
contrary to the suggestion in the Advisory Committee's Note, does nothing to lessen hearsay dangers other than
insincerity. Furthermore, when conduct is nonassertive there is often a substantial ambiguity about the proper
inference to draw about the actor's belief. The medical emergency scenario or some variant of it in the sea cap-
tain hypothetical, for example, is not at all farfetched.
On the other hand, there is often (but not always) an added guarantee of sincerity with nonassertive conduct
evidence because the actor has relied on the belief implied from the conduct. For example, the sea captain
embarked on the boat. In addition, although it would perhaps be preferable to have the out-of-court actor on the
witness stand to explore possible ambiguities in the hearsay inference from conduct to belief, it will be relative-
ly easy for counsel to address the ambiguity issue in closing argument and thus give the jury a sense of the
strength or weakness of the evidence without cross-examination. Furthermore, because the hearsay dangers in
nonverbal nonassertive conduct are not always immediately apparent, one might expect a rule classifying such
evidence as hearsay to be applied unevenly and inconsistently. Finally, the likely absence of a sincerity problem
arguably should itself be sufficient to justify nonhearsay status for nonassertive nonverbal conduct. Most
hearsay exceptions rest primarily on the premise that one or more of the hearsay dangers is unlikely to be pre-
sent. It would be difficult to make a very strong case for the proposition that factfinders are less able accurately
to assess the probative value of nonassertive nonverbal conduct than they are able accurately to assess the pro-
bative value of uncross-examined hearsay statements falling within an exception to the hearsay rule.
21. Unlike nonverbal conduct, verbal conduct always carries with it the risk that the declarant/actor has
inadvertently used an incorrect word or phrase or- has inadvertently omitted an important word or phrase
(improper narration). In cases in which the verbal activity is offered to imply some fact not closely related to
the direct assertions, it seems unlikely that such a narration error, even if undetected, would affect the probative
value of the evidence.
22. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
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pie about Marsden's competence by pretending to treat him as competent (insin-
cerity). Furthermore, the factfinder must infer that the belief in Marsden's com-
petence was accurate. Perhaps when the letter writers last saw Marsden, they
failed to perceive how incompetent he was (misperception), or perhaps by the
time they got around to writing the letters they had forgotten how crazy Marsden
had seemed when they last saw him (poor memory). Of these possible scenarios,
the one that seems most farfetched is the insincerity scenario. The reason that it
seems farfetched is that it is hard to imagine that the letter writers were trying to
assert or communicate anything about Marsden's competence. In other words, in
Wright, as in the nonassertive nonverbal conduct cases, all of the hearsay dangers
are theoretically present, but one can be reasonably sure that the actor/speaker
did not intend to assert the proposition that the evidence is being offered to
prove. As a result, one can be reasonably sure that there is not a sincerity problem.
The language of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 does not provide a clear answer
to whether the Wright evidence should be classified as hearsay. Nonetheless, the
interpretation of Rule 801 that is most consistent with the views of the Advisory
Committee and that brings the most analytical consistency to the federal defini-
tion of hearsay is to classify the evidence in Wright as not hearsay. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 801(a), after noting that nonassertive nonverbal con-
duct should be exempted from the definition of hearsay because the apparent
nonassertiveness eliminates any sincerity problem,23 specifically acknowledges
that "similar considerations" should govern the classification of some instances
of verbal conduct.24 As the preceding analysis indicates, such "similar considera-
23. See supra note 20.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note:
Similar considerations govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is assertive but
offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted, also excluded from the def-
inition of hearsay by the language of subdivision (c) [i.e., not "offered ... to prove the truth of the
matter asserted"].
This passage is puzzling for several reasons. First, since almost all verbal conduct involves an intent to
assert something, the phrase "nonassertive verbal conduct" is an oxymoron. Second, the Note does not indicate
what the difference is between "nonassertive verbal conduct" and "verbal conduct which is assertive but ...."
Id. It seems unlikely, however, that the Note is referring exclusively (if at all) to the types of out-of-court state-
ments that involve no hearsay dangers - for example, statements that are legally operative facts or that show
notice. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rules of Evidence 801(c) addresses these kinds of state-
ments. Third, it is unclear whether the reference to "subdivision (c)" applies to both "nonassertive verbal con-
duct" and "verbal conduct which is assertive but . I..." Id. The fact that the quoted passage appears in the
explanation of subdivision (a) suggests that perhaps the "similar considerations" governing "nonassertive ver-
bal conduct" make such evidence not hearsay by virtue of subdivision (a). Subdivision (a), however, defines a
"statement." See supra note 17. Is "nonassertive verbal conduct" not an assertion? With respect to what is an
assertion the Advisory Committee's Note unhelpfully states only "that nothing is an assertion unless intended to
be one," and "[iut can scarcely be doubted that an assertion made in words is intended by the declarant to be an
assertion." Id.
Because of these ambiguities in the Advisory Committee's Note and the lack of clear guidance in the lan-
guage of Federal Rule of Evidence 801, precisely how one reaches the non-hearsay result in Wright under the
Federal Rules is a bit problematic. Perhaps the specific verbal assertions in the letters are so tangential to or so
far removed from the purpose for which the letter writing activity is being introduced that the letter writing
activity is not an assertion within the meaning of Rule 801(a). Alternatively, one can maintain that the evidence
is not hearsay within the meaning of Rule 801(c) because it is not being offered to prove the truth of any partic-
ular assertions in the letters.
Because the rationale for exempting the letter writing activity from the definition of hearsay is similar to the
rationale for excluding nonassertive nonverbal conduct from the definition of hearsay, my sense of symmetry
moves me in the direction of wanting to rely on the same part of the rule - subsection (a) - to exempt both
pieces of evidence. My sense of practicality, however, tells me that a judge is more likely to be comfortable
with the not "offered... to prove the truth of the matter asserted" language in subsection (c). FED. R. EvD. 801(c).
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tions" exist in a case like Wright. Indeed, the cases are so similar that much of
the caselaw2" and literature26 - both before and after the drafting of the Federal
Rules of Evidence - treat Wright and the nonassertive nonverbal conduct cases
as presenting the identical issue.
The fact that the declarant articulates a proposition that is different from the
proposition that the evidence is offered to prove should not itself be sufficient to
classify the statement as not hearsay under the Federal Rules. Consider, for
example, the following out-of-court statement made in the context of a discus-
sion about the defendant charged with bank robbery and offered against the
defendant: "Well, at least I never robbed a bank." The obvious relevance of the
evidence is to suggest that the speaker believes the defendant did rob the bank
and, further, that this belief comports with what happened. Moreover, from the
context of the statement it appears that the declarant is probably intending to
assert that very proposition. As a result, the evidence should be, and under the
Federal Rules of Evidence presumably would be, considered hearsay."
Between the two extremes of Wright and the bank robbery hypothetical, both
of which it seems to me are quite easy to classify as not hearsay and hearsay
respectively, are a variety of more problematic implied assertions. Consider, for
example, the following: A's out-of-court declaration "Hello John" offered to
prove the implied assertion that John was present with A; B's out-of-court decla-
ration "Beware of the dog" offered to prove the implied assertion that the dog is
dangerous; C's out-of-court assertion "Give me the ring" to prove the implied
assertion that C is the owner of the ring. Reconsider also the Kearley out-of-
court declarations about wanting to purchase drugs offered to prove the implied
assertion that the defendant was a drug dealer and the Ratten out-of-court cry for
help offered to prove the implied assertion that the shooting was not accidental.
In Kearley and Ratten and in the three preceding hypotheticals the relationship
between the declarants' explicit assertions and the implied assertions that they
are offered to prove is less tenuous than the relationship between the letter writ-
ing and the implied assertion of Marsden's competence in Wright. As a result,
there is probably a greater likelihood in each case that the declarant may have
been intending to assert the proposition that the statement is offered to prove.
For example, in Ratten it seems plausible that at the time of her call, the wife was
thinking, "My God, my husband is threatening me with a shotgun and I'm going
to die if I don't get help! Please help me! I need help!" If that is a fair represen-
tation of what the wife was probably thinking, it seems fortuitous that the only
words out of her mouth in the excitement of the moment were the call for help.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Zenni, 492 . Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488
(K.B. 1837).
26. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 366-69
(2d ed. 1982); Charles T. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930).
27. See Roger C. Park, "I Didn 't Tell Them Anything About You ": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the
Federal Rules, 74 MINN. L. REv. 783, 799-800 (1990).
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Viewed from this perspective, Ratten is more like the bank robbery hypothetical
than Wright.28
On the other hand, in some implied assertion cases, despite the existence of a
more direct relationship between the explicit and the implied assertion than in
Wright, it is reasonable to assume that the declarants were not intending to assert
the proposition that the evidence is being offered to prove. For example, it seems
unlikely, at least to me, that the declarants in Kearley were intending to assert
that the defendant was a drug dealer. Rather, they merely wanted to satisfy their
desire for drugs.29
There are three possible ways to deal with the hearsay classification of implied
assertions like those described in the immediately preceding paragraphs. First,
one could ignore or give only very narrow scope to the Advisory Committee's
observation that some instances of verbal conduct give rise to considerations
similar to those that justify treating nonassertive nonverbal conduct as hearsay.
Under this approach all or most implied assertions would be classified as
hearsay. Such a rule would have the benefit of ease of application, but it is an
approach that seems inconsistent with the Advisory Committee's Note.
Moreover, to the extent that this approach would classify as hearsay implied
assertions that were analytically very similar to the implied assertions in Wright,
it is an approach that would treat like situations differently.
Second, one could give a narrow reading to the language in Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 (c) that defines hearsay as a statement offered "to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."3 Under this view, one might maintain that all exclamatory,
hortatory, and other declarations that are not statements of historical fact are not
hearsay because, by definition, they do not assert a truth. Furthermore, one
could maintain that in any other case where the declarant's explicit or obviously
intended assertion was somewhat different from the proposition that the evidence
was offered to prove, the declaration is not hearsay. This rule, too, would be rela-
tively easy to apply, but it would result in the non-hearsay classification of some
out-of-court statements that are more analogous to undisputed hearsay than to
nonassertive nonverbal conduct. Consider, for example, the preceding sugges-
tion that the wife in Ratten may have intended to assert that her husband is about
to kill her. Or consider the assertion "Give me the ring" to prove that the declar-
ant is the owner of the ring. It seems plausible to assume that the declarant may
in fact be thinking and intending to assert, "That ring is mine; give it to me!"
28. Even if one disagrees with this characterization of Ratten, one might argue that there should be special
limitations on the use of implied and explicit out-of-court assertions against criminal defendants. Whether
there should be a special hearsay rule for criminal defendants - either as a matter of the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment or of a special nonconstitutional evidentiary rule - is beyond the scope of this Essay.
29. The multiple requests to purchase drugs and therefore multiple implicit assertions that the defendant was
a drug dealer provided an assurance of trustworthiness that would not have existed with only one request. This
guarantee of trustworthiness would be just as great, however, if the declarants had specifically asserted that the
defendant was selling drugs. One might want a hearsay rule that permits such corroborated statements to be
admissible. The corroborative aspect of Kearley, however, has nothing to do with whether the evidence should
be not hearsay because it is being used to imply a fact different from what the declarants were asserting.
30. See FED. R. EvID. 80 1(c).
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The third approach to classifying implied assertions as hearsay is to ask on a
case-by-case basis whether the evidence is more like the evidence in Wright or
the evidence in the bank robbery hypothetical. More precisely, the question to
ask is whether the declarant was probably intending to assert the proposition that
the evidence is being offered to prove. For example, if one concludes that
Ratten's wife was intending to communicate that her husband was threatening
her or that the declarant demanding the ring was intending to assert ownership,
the evidence would be hearsay. Similarly if one believes (which I do not) that the
declarants in Kearley were intending to assert, "Kearley is a drug dealer and I
want to buy drugs from him," those declarations would be hearsay.31
The advantage of this third approach is that it provides an analytically coherent
manner for dealing with implied assertions that is consistent with the Federal
Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee's comments about implied assertions.32
The principal disadvantage of the approach is that it may yield inconsistent
results. Trying to determine what unarticulated thoughts were in the mind of the
declarant will seldom be easy. Moreover, it is not clear precisely what one
should be trying to determine. For example, the declarant demanding the ring
may be quite consciously attempting to communicate a claim of ownership.
Alternatively, although the declarant may not be consciously thinking about
asserting a claim of ownership at the precise moment of the statement, the
declarant may have been thinking about the ownership question for some time
and those thoughts may be the motivation for the demand. I am aware of nothing
in either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the literature of implied assertions that
grapples with the question how direct or immediate or conscious the intent to
assert the proposition that the evidence is being offered to prove should be in
order to classify the evidence as hearsay. Moreover, I am skeptical that such an
inquiry would be fruitful.
The risk of inconsistent results under this third approach (or the result of exclu-
sion under the first approach) is largely - but not entirely - offset by a point
frequently lost in the heat of academic debate over whether implied assertions
are hearsay: Whenever an implied assertion is classified as hearsay, the hearsay
rule should not be a bar to admissibility if the assertion fits within a hearsay
exception; and many implied assertions fit comfortably within one or both of the
31. With respect to nonverbal conduct, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801 (a) states that the burden
of proof on the question whether the conduct is assertive should be on the person claiming that the conduct is
assertive. Which party should have the burden of proof with respect to the declarant's intent in implied asser-
tion cases should depend on one's assessment of (a) whether the majority of these cases are likely to be more
similar to Wright or the bank robbery hypothetical and (b) whether judges are likely to have a bias toward find-
ing that the declarant did or did not intend to assert the proposition that the evidence is offered to prove. For
example, if one assumes that most implied assertion cases are analogous to Wright and that judges may have a
bias toward classifying the evidence as hearsay, the burden of proof should be on the party claiming that the
evidence is hearsay.
32. See supra note 24.
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Federal Rules of Evidence spontaneous declaration exceptions33 - 803(1) (pre-
sent sense impression) and 803(2) (excited utterance). 4
The primary justification for both of these exceptions is that the probable
spontaneity of the declaration tends to ensure that the declarant is sincere.3"
Indeed, to the extent that one can be confident that the declaration is sponta-
neous, it is necessarily sincere, for the spontaneity removes the possibility for
forethought and fabrication.36 With excited utterances, the requirements that
there be a "startling event or condition,"'3 that the declaration occur "while the
declarant [is] under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition,"38
and that the declaration "relate[] to"39 the startling event or condition tend to
ensure that the declaration is spontaneous. With present sense impression decla-
rations, the requirements that the declaration is "describing or explaining"4 an
event or condition and that the declaration occurs during the perception of the
event or condition or "immediately thereafter" '41 tend to ensure that the declara-
tion is spontaneous.
At least one and perhaps two or three of the implied assertions discussed in
this Essay fall within the excited utterance exception. The wife's call for help in
Ratten "relat[ed] to" what surely must have been an exciting event,42 and there
33. Implied assertions may satisfy other hearsay exceptions. For example, some implied assertions may be
sufficiently reliable to fall within Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5), the residual exceptions for hearsay not covered by
other exceptions "but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"; the statement "I need to
see an orthopedic surgeon" offered to prove that the declarant has a broken arm, if hearsay, may be admissible
pursuant to Rule 803(4) (statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); and implied assertions
offered to show the declarant's state of mind, if hearsay, should be admissible pursuant to Rule 803(3) (then
existing mental, emotional, or physical condition). See supra note 9.
34. FED. R. EVD. 803(3):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness.
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
35. FED. R. EvID. 803(1), (2) advisory committee's note.
The fact that present sense impression declarations must occur and that excited utterances usually occur
within close temporal proximity to the event minimizes the risk of a memory problem. The fact of an exciting
event, however, may increase the danger of misperception and perhaps inaccurate narration. See Robert M.
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28
COLUM. L. RE. 432 (1928); Frederic D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 975-88 (1977).
36. Cf supra note 21 and accompanying text (to the extent one can be confident that actor/declarant is not
intending to assert proposition for which evidence is offered, one can be confident that actor/declarant is sin-
cere).
37. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. FED. R. Evro. 803(1).
41. Id.
42. There is no precise definition for the phrase "relating to" in Rule 803(2). The Advisory Committee's
Note to Rules 803(1), (2), however, makes it clear that one should read this phrase more broadly than the phrase
"describing or explaining" in Rule 803(1):
Permissible subject matter of the statement is limited under Exception (1) to description or expla-
nation of the event or condition, the assumption being that spontaneity, in the absence of a startling
event, may extend no farther. In Exception (2), however, the statement need only "relate" to the
startling event or condition, thus affording a broader scope of subject matter coverage.
FED. R. EvID. 803(1), (2) advisory committee's note.
IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AND THE HEARSAY RULE
would seem to be little doubt that she was under the influence of the exciting
event at the time of the call.43 Similarly, if the warning about the dog were
prompted by the declarant's perception that the dog was about to attack, or if the
demand for the ring were a response to its attempted theft, the excited utterance
exception would appear to apply to those declarations. Moreover, each of these
three declarations, as well as the declaration "Hello, John" offered to show that
John was present, are sufficiently contemporaneous to satisfy the time require-
ment of Rule 803(1), the present sense impression exception."
With respect to the present sense impression exception, one might object that
the call for help or the declarations "Beware of the dog," "Give me the ring," or
"Hello John" are not "describing or explaining an event or condition."45 One
must recall, however, that these declarations are hearsay in the first place only if
the classifier regards them as tantamount to the assertions "My husband is
threatening me," "That dog is dangerous," "The ring belongs to me," and "John is
here with me." These statements do describe or explain events or conditions. If
one characterizes the declarations in this manner to fit them within the definition
of hearsay, one should use the same characterization in determining the applica-
bility of the hearsay exceptions.
Of course, not all implied assertions classified as hearsay will fit neatly within
one of the spontaneous declaration exceptions. For example, to classify the
Kearley declarations as hearsay is to take the position that they are tantamount to
the assertion, "Kearley is a drug dealer." That assertion describes or explains an
ongoing (at least to the point of Kearley's arrest) status or avocation or character-
istic, but is being a drug dealer an "event or condition" within the meaning of
Rule 803(l)?46 Moreover, since Kearley had been arrested and the declarants
were speaking to police officers, can one reasonably regard the assertions as hav-
ing been made while or immediately after the declarants were "perceiving" the
event or condition? Finally, and most importantly, even if one can stretch the
words of Rule 803(1) to encompass the assertion "Kearley is a drug dealer," is
that assertion one that is likely to be sincere because it is spontaneous?
43. There is, of course, always the possibility of fabrication. Cf supra notes 18 and 22 and accompanying
text (possibility that sea captain was intending to create false impression about seaworthiness of vessel; possi-
bility letter writers were trying to create false impression that Marsden was competent).
44. In some cases there may be a question whether there really was an (exciting) event or condition. How
does one know, for example, that there was an (exciting) event in Ratten? If the only indication of an event or
condition is the hearsay declaration itself, should that be sufficient to establish that there was an event or condi-
tion? For a discussion of these issues see ALLEN & KuHNs, supra note 9, at 395-97, 428-29; Carhryn M. Taylor,
The Need for a New Approach to the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception After State v. Flesher, 67
IOWA L. REv. 179 (1981).
45. FED. R. EviD. 803(1).
46. Although the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(1), (2) briefly discusses the meaning of "describ-
ing or explaining," see supra note 36, there is no discussion of the meaning of"event or condition."
1995]
150 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW RE VIEW [VOL. 16:1
If the answer to any of these questions is no, the only way to admit the Kearley
evidence is to find some other hearsay exception47 or to decide in the first
instance to classify the evidence as non-hearsay. As the earlier analysis suggest-
ed, the most sound result under the Federal Rules of Evidence would be to classi-
fy the Kearley evidence as non-hearsay.
47. If the prosecution could establish that the declarants were unavailable and if one regarded the declara-
tions as assertions about criminal activity of the declarants as well as the defendants, the declaration against
interest exception may be available. See FEo. R. EviD. 804(b)(3). If the prosecution could establish that
Kearley and the declarants were coconspirators and that the statements were made during and in furtherance of
the conspiracy, the statements would be admissible as coconspirators' admissions. Admissions are treated as an
exception to the hearsay rule at common law; under the Federal Rules, admissions are exempted from the defin-
ition of hearsay. See FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(2)(E). There is also the possibility of admitting the statements pur-
suant to the residual hearsay exceptions. See supra note 33.
DISCUSSION: CONDUCT, PERFORMATIVE SPEECH, AND COMMUNICATION
Christopher B. Mueller
June 14
The split among essayists on the question whether drug calls merit hearsay
treatment indicates a borderland where arguments can be made on each side. I
think words impart information about the world not only because humans use
them to express or communicate ideas but because they are instrumental (they
get things done), and the performative aspect sometimes justifies nonhearsay
treatment. Under the Rules, the acts by Baron Parke's captain in inspecting the
ship, then embarking with family,1 are nonhearsay if offered to prove that the
ship is seaworthy. The same outcome should be possible if he arranges passage
for his family and sends them off, even though here he acts using words.
In his essay, Roger Park elaborates themes that he sounded in his path-breaking
work about Reynolds ("I didn't tell them anything about you"),2 and I think he is
right in important ways - words should not be read to assert points far beyond
the meaning intended by the speaker; borderland problems should not be
addressed by tinkering with definitions; verbal behavior can be analogous to
nonassertive conduct. Richard Kuhns agrees on the latter point in his own strong
piece,' and I think he is right to treat the problem as one of proper accommoda-
tion between the concepts of "verbal conduct" and "assertion."4
On the facts of Regina v. Kearley, I agree with Kuhns and Park that the cus-
tomers probably did not intend to say that Kearley dealt drugs, and yet what they
did suggests as much. If the words do not say he deals, how do they prove it, and
what role does hearsay doctrine play? The situation is similar to the ship captain
example. As Margaret Berger says, "the declarants acted - they telephoned the
defendant's home and came to his door,"6 and we might add that they sought the
defendant and said, in effect, "I want drugs; let's deal." What they did proves he
deals, and hearsay doctrine should not apply to this aspect of their behavior.
Park says that performativity only counts with verbal acts and that my broader
concept may not involve significant reliance that would satisfy concerns over
sincerity.7 But reliance elements do not correlate with physical behavior as
opposed to verbal conduct, and words are not instrumental only when laws say
so. Boarding a ship with one's family and arranging passage for the family bring
reliance elements, even if one is mostly action and the other mostly words.
(Checking for mail brings trivial reliance elements, and telling one's child she
can handle ski conditions on the Wild Irishman ski run brings large ones: The
1. Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
2. Roger C. Park, The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 125 (1995). The refer-
ence is to United States v. Reynolds, 687 E2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1982), modified, 710 E2d 431, 436 (1983).
3. Richard B. Kuhns, Implied Assertions and the Hearsay Rule, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 139 (1995).
4. Id.
5. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
6. Margaret A. Berger, How Would or Should the Supreme Court Interpret the Definitions in Rule 801?, 16
Miss. C. L. REv. 13, 16 (1995).
7. Park, supra note 2, at 132-35.
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former is nonhearsay under the Rules if offered to prove the actor had not picked
up the day's delivery; the performative aspect of the latter merits consideration
for possible nonhearsay treatment if the advice is offered to prove the child has
the skill to handle the slope.) Distinguishing saying from doing confines hearsay
doctrine to behavior that proves the point by intentionally communicating or
expressing it and behavior that proves it another way; it does not merely distin-
guish speech from physical movement.
Park says one of my examples ("Don't trip on the curb") works not because the
words are performative but because they present low hearsay risks and would fit
an exception.8 He says other examples ("Don't trip the lever" and "Don't go to
Dr. Curb") have "as much" performative aspect but should be hearsay if offered
to prove some prior fact.' We can only know whether his examples may have
important performative aspects if we look at context, which means performativi-
ty is similar to other criteria: "Here's the car" is a verbal act if we know the
speaker handed over the keys, not if he had seen a robbery and was going around
with the detective to see if he could find the getaway car. Suppose the fellow
who said, "Don't trip the lever," had operated the machine, that it malfunctioned
in ways that caused delay or damage, and he spoke to the person on the next shift
who would likely operate the lever but would heed the warning, the purpose
being to show that tripping the lever had caused the malfunction. Here the words
have a significant performative aspect that merits consideration in choosing
between hearsay and nonhearsay treatment.
Eleanor Swift reaches what I think is the right answer by another route, empha-
sizing that factfinders can evaluate such proof by thinking up "the various gener-
alizations that might explain it," which would not depend on "the testimonial
qualities of individual declarants."1 She is right, and right that the sheer number
of calls has something to do with our willingness to evaluate the proof without as
much fear that the calls are a charade or plot against the defendant (assertions
masquerading as acts). In terms I find useful, this feature helps justify giving
greater weight to the performative aspect of the calls.
Roger C. Park
June 18
I agree with much of what Chris Mueller wrote, but I will yield to my law pro-
fessor instincts and focus on a point on which I disagree with him. He wrote:
Park says one of my examples ("Don't trip on the curb") works not because the
words are performative but because they present low hearsay risks and would fit
8. Park, supra note 2, at 134.
9. Park, supra note 2, at 134.
10. Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 75, 82 (1995).
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an exception. He says other examples ("Don't trip the lever" and "Don't go to
Dr. Curb") have "as much" performative aspect but should be hearsay if offered
to prove some prior fact. We can only know whether his examples may have
important performative aspects if we look at context, which means performativi-
ty is similar to other criteria: "Here's the car" is a verbal act if we know the
speaker handed over the keys, not if he had seen a robbery and was going
around with the detective to see if he could find the getaway car. Suppose the
fellow who said, "Don't trip the lever," had operated the machine, that it mal-
functioned in ways that caused delay or damage, and he spoke to the person on
the next shift who would likely operate the lever but would heed the warning,
the purpose being to show that tripping the lever had caused the malfunction.
Here the words have a significant performative aspect that merits consideration
in choosing between hearsay and nonhearsay treatment.1
Here is my response:
It seems to me that Chris Mueller's elaboration of my "Don't trip the lever"
hypothetical adds facts that make the statement more probative than it otherwise
would be. However, it is the statement's enhanced reliability, not its "performa-
tivity," that makes the statement in the revised hypothetical a good candidate for
admission into evidence. The statement seems reliable because the hypothetical
declarant was evidently an experienced machine operator who had observed the
malfunction while personally operating the machine. Suppose instead that the
person who said "Don't trip the lever" knew little about the machine and had a
notoriously weak understanding of mechanical causation, but was a hothead who
was known to pick fights with people who did not follow his advice, and further-
more was the operator's boss. Would not my hypothetical hothead-boss's utter-
ance be even more "performative" than the utterance in the enhanced "Don't trip
the lever" hypothetical presented by Professor Mueller? Surely the "performa-
tive" strength of an utterance offered to show belief depends on factors other
than the degree to which the declarant's belief is well-grounded. If one is going
to use the term "performative" to cover utterances that are not operative lan-
guage, then it seems to me that saying that the utterance is "performative" con-
notes that it has force and power, not that the person making the utterance has a
credible basis for the imputed belief.
I think Professor Mueller has not touched my other hypothetical - "Don't go
to Dr. Curb." Let us say the declarant who said those words had the power to
prevent the addressee from seeing Dr. Curb, so the words were strongly "perfor-
mative," if "performativity" means that they have force and impact. I would still
hate to have the utterance admitted as evidence that Dr. Curb had in fact botched
an operation witnessed earlier by the declarant. Words can hit hard without
being backed by good facts or good judgment. Might does not make insight.
1. Christopher B. Mueller, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 152 (1995) (responding to
Roger C. Park) (internal citations omitted).
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So, to no one's surprise, I am still not convinced that the performative utter-
ance concept helps here. I would classify operative language as nonhearsay
when it is offered to show its operative effect, but where the language is offered
to show a belief of the declarant, I would look to guides other than "performativi-
ty" in deciding whether an utterance is hearsay.
While I realize that definitions do not solve everything, I think that Chris
Mueller could illuminate his theory by more fully defining his concepts. So,




Although we often come to similar solutions, Roger Park and I seem to differ
on an important point. He would "classify operative language as nonhearsay
when it is offered to show its operative effect," but not when offered to show "a
belief of the declarant," where he would look to "guides other than 'performativi-
ty.' "1 He would surely be even firmer in this view if the purpose were to show
an act, event, or condition that the indicated belief suggests. That is a respectable
position (close to Baron Parke's), but I think hearsay doctrine should not have so
broad a reach. I think the framers of the Rules were right to go another way, and
their distinction between saying and doing applies to behavior without words and
to behavior with words. I think proof that one wrote a check for a down-payment
and signed a contract with a car dealer is properly viewed as nonhearsay evi-
dence to show the deal (verbal act), to show her wish or need (belief), and to
show her present car is old or not good enough.
Park fleshes out his example "Don't trip the lever" differently than I did.2 I
added the context under which this command would tend to prove the lever
caused a machine to malfunction and in which the command would affect the
behavior of the operator. Under Park's different elaboration, the speaker "knew
little about the machine," had a "notoriously weak understanding of mechanical
causation," was "a hothead who was known to pick fights with people who didn't
follow his advice," but he was the "boss."3 I will respond in three ways.
First, the command is irrelevant if we are sure the speaker did not know what
caused the malfunction. If the point is uncertain, the judge can use the doctrine
of conditional relevancy to deal with this problem.
1. Roger C. Park, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or






Second, if the speaker is a "fight-picking hothead," his behavior may be less
persuasive (same if we use a car filled with teenagers cruising Saturday night to
show who had the green light). There are no perfect criteria for reliable proof -
not in the categorical exceptions, nor hearsay doctrine generally, nor in relevancy
or performativity. But the performative aspect of words gives us additional rea-
sons (beyond their assertive aspects), to appraise human behavior and draw infer-
ences about the world. If the boss gives an order likely to be followed ("Don't
trip the lever"), his reaction gives reason to suppose that the lever caused the
malfunction that we would not have if he had said to another worker having noth-
ing to do with the machine that "the lever caused the malfunction."
Third, discounting the performative aspect of behavior discounts human ratio-
nality. Most bosses are not people who pick fights when directions are followed
(do not need to); most do not give orders about equipment they do not under-
stand (useless; risky); most understand the equipment their workers use (to be
good bosses, they need to). The very fact that somebody has done something,
given adequate contextual information, gives us reason to make intelligent
deductions about facts apparently in the purview of the actor.
Other examples ("Don't go to Dr. Curb") can be discussed, and the conversa-
tion would parallel this one. We need to know the factual setting to appraise
what the statement does. Then we can determine whether this aspect is useful in
relation to the point to be proved. If the speaker is a tarot reader advising Nancy,
"Don't go to Dr. Curb," the performative aspect may suggest that the cards cast
doubt on Nancy's purpose to see that doctor (or the cards do not say anything but
the reader needs a "medical hook" to keep Nancy as a customer). If the speaker
is Nancy's treating oncologist and he knows Nancy is moving to Santa Barbara
and was told to "look up Dr. Curb for further treatment when you arrive," and the
speaker says, "Don't go to Dr. Curb, go to Dr. Stone," the performative aspect of
redirecting the patient supports inferences that are probably also asserted (Stone
would be better to see for someone in her condition). Words do not need to "hit
hard" to have a performative aspect, and "might" makes no difference, although
perhaps "mighty" people do more things (with words and otherwise) than non-
mighty people.
Like assertion itself (which the Rules do not define, but should be understood
to mean intentionally expressing or communicating an idea), performativity is a
broad concept that reaches all the other things people do with words. Elsewhere
I have described performativity as causing things to happen, bringing into being
or carrying on human relationships, or changing the positions of the declarant
and others. I think further elaboration is possible and inevitable. I have offered
it here and elsewhere in particular contexts, and perhaps there are additional
ways to elaborate the idea for general application.
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Craig R. Callen
June 19
This is in response to Professor Mueller's discussion of performative speech
under the hearsay rule. He said:
Like assertion itself (which the Rules do not define, but should be understood
to mean intentionally expressing or communicating an idea), performativity is
a broad concept that reaches all the other things people do with words.
Elsewhere I have described performativity as causing things to happen, bringing
into being or carrying on human relationships, or changing the positions of the
declarant and others. I think further elaboration is possible and inevitable. I
have offered it here and elsewhere in particular contexts, and perhaps there are
additional ways to elaborate the idea for general application.1
The concept of performative speech seems to be a good way to explain why
communications creating legal rights and obligations are not hearsay when
offered to show the existence of those rights or obligations. Drawing concepts
such as performative speech from other disciplines, in an effort to understand
evidence, is laudable.
The effort to expand the notion of performativity to reach other statements and
other probative goals, however, rests on a notion of performative communication
that could be very slippery in practice. It may also conflate the definition of
hearsay with the exceptions in a way that might make the Rules more confusing.
To illustrate, let me use a hypothetical that Chris Mueller and I have discussed
privately, in a slightly different form: Suppose that the police raided an apart-
ment and found therein a form letter addressed to Carlos Almaden from a bank,
in which the bank thanked him for opening a new account, and enclosed a debit
card, saying that "We afford this service to all our new gold-level customers."
Alternatively, suppose that the police found a computer-generated NSF check
notice addressed to Carlos Almaden from the bank. Assume that the state wishes
to show that a person known as Almaden lived in the apartment, or was an asso-
ciate of the tenants. (Professor Mueller does not agree with one possible argu-
ment that the letters should not be hearsay: that the letters do not assert that
Almaden may be reached through the apartment. Accordingly, I will not go into
that argument here.)
I understand from discussions I have had with Professor Mueller that he would
consider the evidence in the NSF check example performative and not hearsay,
and I suspect that he would consider the evidence in the debit card example not
to be hearsay. This seems hard to square with the recognition that the bank's
computer records, from which the computer itself generates form letters and NSF
1. Christopher B. Mueller, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. RE. 154, 155 (1995) (respond-
ing to Roger C. Park).
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check notices, would themselves be hearsay if offered to show that someone
named Carlos Almaden lived, or received mail at, the apartment.
His argument may be that the bank's action in reliance on the data in its com-
puter banks shows the evidence to be more reliable than one might otherwise
think. The bank's willingness to base statements or communications on the data
does make those data seem more probative than randomly collected data. Then
again, the statements that satisfy hearsay exceptions are more probative than ran-
dom statements. The reliance argument seems better suited to an argument that




If verbal activity theoretically implicating all of the hearsay dangers can ever
be nonhearsay, the activities of the bank employees in Craig Callen's hypothetical
should easily qualify.' It is unlikely that any employee involved in the process of
generating the material sent to the (assumed) customer was trying to assert or
communicate anything about the customer's address. Indeed, it may be that most
of the steps in the process of generating the material were carried out by pre-pro-
grammed computers that rely either on the written application supplied by the
customer or on a bank employee's transferral of that information into the bank
computers. In either case it seems appropriate to characterize the employee's
(and programmer's) activities as performance (Chris Mueller's framework) or to
analogize the activities to nonassertive nonverbal conduct (my framework).
A second, potentially more difficult question raised by Craig's hypothetical is
how to deal with the address information supplied in the application to open the
account, for, after all, it is that information upon which the factfinder will ulti-
mately be relying. In the precise context of Craig's hypothetical this question
should be easy to resolve. I assume that the customer filled out or approved the
information in the application form, and that the information is being offered
against the customer. Thus, even if one characterizes the evidence as hearsay
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a)-(c), the evidence is admissible as an
admission.
In a context in which the admissions exemption is not available, I would still
like to admit the evidence. A proper interpretation of the current federal hearsay
rule, however, may prevent that result. One might argue that filling out the appli-
cation was likely to have been a fairly routine process with little likelihood of
intentional fabrication; i.e., that the evidence is nonhearsay because it is analo-
gous to nonassertive nonverbal conduct in that the applicant was probably not
1. See Craig R. Callen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of The Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 MIss. C. L. REv. 156, 156-57 (1995) (responding
to Christopher B. Mueller).
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thinking specifically about communicating the place of residence to anybody.
On the other hand, the applicant presumably was responding to a particular ques-
tion on the application form. Moreover, the applicant may have been particularly
conscious of stating the address accurately because of an awareness that impor-
tant correspondence would be coming from the bank. -Such an intent to commu-
nicate - even if one assumes it is an intent to communicate accurately - should
require classification of the evidence as hearsay under the Federal Rules.
What should one assume about how conscious or immediate the customer's
intent to communicate the address was? And how conscious or immediate must
this intent be in order for the evidence to be hearsay? Nothing in Rule 801 or in
the Advisory Committee's Note provides much guidance. Although I confess
that I do not really understand the Advisory Committee's terse assertion that "an
assertion made in words is intended by the declarant to be an assertion,"2 I sus-
pect that this language may suggest that providing an address in response to a
specific question should be hearsay. If supplying the address information is
hearsay, then admissibility depends upon finding an exception. Except, possibly,
for the residual exceptions, none seems applicable.
Regardless of what conclusion one reaches about the hearsay classification in
Craig's hypothetical, the attempt to apply the hearsay rule requires an incredibly
intricate analysis. (Moreover, if one assumes that the evidence is relevant for a
slightly different purpose - to show some minimal connection between the cus-
tomer and the residence or some awareness of the residence by the customer -
the hearsay analysis may be a bit different.)3 I suspect that the intricacies will
elude many lawyers and judges in the heat of battle. That, it seems to me, is a
strong reason to move in the direction, initially suggested in this Symposium by
Ron Allen, of dismantling the hearsay rule.4 On the other hand, if one assumes
that the hearsay rule is easy to apply and works fairly well in the vast majority of
cases, leaving discussions of this type to the academics causes no great harm -
except to the extent that it keeps us from dealing with problems of more sub-
stance (but perhaps that is a benefit).
Briefly, on another strain: I share the concern that without some constraints on
the use of hearsay, there may be a relatively high risk of perjury. Indeed, one of
the things that struck me about Regina v. Kearley' was how odd it seemed for so
many people to be asking a stranger for drugs. Perhaps the drug users' need to
satisfy their habit was so great or the previous enforcement of drug laws was so
lax that there were a number of not very cautious would-be purchasers. I am
skeptical, however, of the evidence in Kearley and other drug and gambling cases
where the police testify to similar evidence. (Does anybody have a handle on the
perjury problem in these contexts?) On the other hand, the hearsay rule, at least
in its current form, is an extremely crude device for dealing with this problem.
2. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
3. See, e.g., Bridges v. State, 19 N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 1945) (child molestation case).
4. See Ronald J. Allen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. Rav. 91, 92 (1995) (responding to
Richard D. Friedman).





Craig Callen asks about letters to Carlos Almaden, offered to prove where he
lives.' Carlos appeared in United States v. Singer2 where the court said that an
eviction notice to him at 600 Wilshire was not hearsay as proof he lived there.'
In Craig's thoughtful two-part hypothetical, Carlos gets (1) a letter thanking him
for opening an account and enclosing a debit card and (2) a NSF notice.4 Dick
Kuhns got it right (nonhearsay if ever such verbal behavior can be nonhearsay).'
As Craig knew and Dick recognized, it is hard to put bank records into the
business record exception (source of datum is not a business insider). But banks
likely have it right: For an established account (many monthly statements), error
in the address is unlikely or implausible, and arguably dealing with the customer
gives insiders the requisite knowledge in the ordinary course.6 And courts admit
hotel registrations if the clerk verifies identity on check-in, to prove the named
person was there (again right; again the result strains theory and the business
records exception). When you have a NSF notice, the performative aspect adds
significantly to the power of the proof: Failing to give notice affects rights and
liabilities of the bank and depositor, and the bank is especially likely to take care.
(Of course I would not know firsthand, but I hear tell that banks even phone cus-
tomers before sending NSF notices, which would insure that the human agent
looks, thinks, and takes precautions.)
The Thank You/debit card situation is harder because the account is new and
presumably there is no history. But I will bet that banks are careful here, too -
barking up the wrong tree (Rich Friedman's happy metaphor) would get 'em in
trouble, and not once in living memory have I gotten someone else's credit card
or gotten solicitations to take (preapproved) cards that were seriously misad-
dressed. I would stress what the bank was doing, and it is no leap of faith to sup-
pose they made reasonable checks and likely got it right. And if they are wrong,
how likely is it that a jury will somehow be overwhelmed or unwilling to accept
corrective information?
1. Craig R. Callen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 156 (1995) (responding to
Christopher B. Mueller).
2. 687 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1982).
3. Id. at 1147.
4. Callen, supra note 1, at 156.
5. Richard B. Kuhns, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 157 (1995) (responding to Craig R.
Callen).
6. See Posner's opinion in Agfa-Gevaert v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 E2d 1518, 1523 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
"All perception is inferential, and most knowledge social; since Kant we have known that there is no unmediat-
ed contact between nature and thought"). It suffices that business people would rely on customer responses.
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Roger C. Park
June 20
Chris Mueller would admit performative utterances as nonhearsay not only
when they are used to show their operative effect, but also when they are used for
a double inference to the declarant's belief and then to the truth of the facts on
which the belief is evidently based.'
In a recent message he gave guidance about the meaning of "performativity."
He wrote:
Like assertion itself (which the Rules do not define, but should be understood to
mean intentionally expressing or communicating an idea), performativity is a
broad concept that reaches all the other things people do with words. Elsewhere
I have described performativity as causing things to happen, bringing into being
or carrying on human relationships, or changing the positions of the declarant
and others.2
Under those guidelines and the ones he has given elsewhere, it seems to me
that any accusation of crime has a strong performative aspect (it changes the
relationship of the accuser and accused). An accusation that publicly ruptured an
intimate relationship would have an especially strong performative aspect. An
indictment or criminal complaint would have still more octane. If a high perfor-
mativity index means that an utterance is not hearsay, is an accusation not
hearsay, when offered to show that the accused was guilty?
Now, I do not think Chris Mueller would advocate holding that accusations,
indictments, and complaints are automatically not hearsay regardless of the cir-
cumstances. It does seem to me, however, that he is advocating a balancing
approach to defining hearsay under which an utterance's performativity index is
weighed against other considerations. Under that approach, accusations, indict-
ments, and complaints would get some plus points because of their "performativ-
ity." That concerns me because I have always thought that those utterances were
at the core of what rules excluding hearsay ought to protect against. Even in sit-
uations in which the constitutionalized aspect of the hearsay doctrine does not
apply (for example, when the evidence is offered to exonerate the defendant by
incriminating another person), I would worry about saying that the evidence is
not hearsay.
I am not convinced that the fact that an utterance "does" something ought to
count in favor of admitting it when it is not offered for what it does, but rather
for what it "says." At any rate, performativity is a hard concept to get one's mind
around. Hearsay doctrine is too complicated already. I would worry that telling
jurists to weigh the performativity index against other factors would just add
1. Christopher B. Mueller, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 154, 155 (1995) (respond-




another layer of complexity. As Chris Mueller has written elsewhere, all words




Professor Richard Kuhns makes one point that seems to confirm one of my
criticisms of the argument for treating performative communications, which are
not offered as operative language, as nonhearsay.'
Broadening the concept of performative speech to that extent tends to conflate
the definition of hearsay with the exceptions. A good example is Dick's treat-
ment of the computer data in the banking examples I used (as distinct from the
hearsay classification of the new customer's initial statements). He says that it
may be "more appropriate" to classify the data about depositors that bank
employees insert into computer data bases as nonhearsay - as either performa-
tive or by analogy to nonassertive nonverbal conduct.2 That seems to entail the
conclusion that any document that might fit under the business record rule
should be nonhearsay; at the least it would cover any electronic database used for
commercial purposes. The analysis Professors Kuhns and Mueller use is, to that
extent, very difficult to square with the current construction of the hearsay rules,
and the existence of Federal Rule 803(6).
Dick is clearly correct that the bank's letters would be admissible as admis-
sions if offered against the customer. But what if the letters are offered against a
woman (unlikely to have given the new accounts an application stating that her
name is "Carlos Almaden"), lessee of the apartment, to show her association
with Carlos?
I believe his argument has two strings to its bow. First, the new customer's
insertion of information into the name and address blanks (or communication to
the new accounts officer) may not assert that the information is correct, since the
applicant may not have been thinking about communicating his place of resi-
dence to anyone. This is a weak argument, as I think he recognizes. Certainly
the new customer would understand the bank officer's request to be one for accu-
rate, rather than random, information.
3. Christopher B. Mueller, Incoming Drug Calls and Performative Words: They're Not Just Talking About
It, Baron Parke!, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 117 (1995).
1. See Richard B. Kuhns, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
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Second, he believes that classifying the letters from the bank as hearsay would
involve "incredibly intricate analysis."3 I suspect that people not trained in the
intricacies of literalist construction of statements under the hearsay rule would
have very little trouble concluding that, by posting a letter to Byron White at the
Supreme Court, I am communicating to the Post Office that he receives mail
there. Similarly, I doubt that one could convince laypeople that data in a bank's
databases are not communications about the persons in whose files the data are
placed. The intricacy of analysis only arises when one tries to reconcile treating
those communications as hearsay with decisions that seem to find any way possi-
ble to exclude statements from hearsay even though those statements might be
admissible under exceptions.
I do realize that it may be difficult to admit bank statements or hotel records, to
show the customer's identity, under the existing exceptions, assuming one does
not employ the residual exceptions. If the probative value of the letters is as high
as Dick and Chris seem to believe, though, there is no reason not to use the resid-
ual exception, assuming that the prosecution has no better evidence. The resid-
ual exceptions certainly do have their flaws. In the final analysis Roger Park is
correct in pointing out that the performative speech analysis complicates the def-
inition of hearsay too much.4 Any communication will have some performative
characteristics. Addressing Dick's approach, any communication will be analo-
gous to nonverbal non-assertive conduct in some way - if for no other reason
than that the speaker is more likely to say that X is the case if X is in fact the




I had hoped to address other issues, but Roger Park's penetrating and thought-
ful queries1 merit response. I hope his interest is shared, and I apologize for what
might be harping too much on a theme. You are right, Roger, that I would not
admit an accusation of a crime to prove the substance of the allegations in the
ensuing trial. That is indeed at the core. You are right again that I would find
such accusations have performative aspects. But what performative aspects sup-
3. Id. at 158.
4. Roger C. Park, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 160 (1995) (responding to
Christopher B. Mueller).
1. See Roger C. Park, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would




port in deductions about the past, and what assertive aspects can prove, differ
considerably. One reason we depend on language is that it is such a rich medium
that conveys information more efficiently and in greater detail than do physical
behavior or performative aspects of behavior that include words.
Suppose Wife N goes to police/prosecutors and makes allegations about seri-
ous physical abuse by Husband 0, specifying dates/acts. 0 is charged with bat-
tery. In doing what she did, N creates difficulties and tensions in the relationship
(adds to them) and for 0 (who may lose livelihood and freedom). Do N's state-
ments have performative aspects? Yes. (From the fact that N did what is hard for
spouses and is going to affect the relationship profoundly - invoking police
power against the other spouse - you can conclude something untoward hap-
pened.) Would I admit N's statements, in the trial of 0 for the crimes N charges,
as nonhearsay proof that 0 committed the acts? No: Her words only prove the
specific acts in their assertive aspect, as intentional claims that 0 did them.
Now suppose N has been stabbed to death, and 0 is charged with murder. The
prosecutor thinks 0 has long behaved in a hostile and aggressive manner toward
N; the pattern indicates intent to control, to inflict harm under some conditions,
and perhaps even a growing plan to commit murder. Can the prosecutor use the
prior behavior of N in bringing abuse charges? I would say that the performative
aspect of bringing such charges would present a strong argument in favor of
admitting proof that she went to authorities and signed statements charging N
with abuse. I would not admit the statements as such, at least not over a defense
objection, but would look for ways to get across to the jury that this woman went
to police for help and sought to press abuse charges as a way of proving that
some acts of abuse were likely committed.
In the trial of O.J. Simpson, Judge Ito let Ron Ship (then a police officer spe-
cializing in domestic violence) testify in this vein: [Question] "Without telling
us what Nicole said to you on the phone, please tell us what you did as a result of
that call." [Answer] "As a result of that call, I gathered together my materials on
domestic abuse and went and talked to Nicole about violence in marriage." I am
not sure I would have done it exactly that way, but the message got out that
Nicole sought help from authorities, apparently because she was being abused by
O.J. (The 911 calls were proved as excited utterances, which made them compe-
tent in their assertive aspect to prove exactly what she described. Other instances
will not get in - hearsay, ambiguity, remoteness.) Finally, Roger, I do not think
it is my concept of performativity that complicates things - we have to take the
world as we find it. And I do not think every statement brings a performative
aspect that gives judges a choice, or that performativity will make hearsay doc-
trine disappear or render it squishy soft with evasive potential. While all speech
has performative aspects, I do not think those aspects are useful (or would sup-
port admissibility) in most cases, in light of the point to be proved. Often the
performative aspects are trivial or unrelated to verbal content (or the point to be
proved); often, the more general inferences possible from looking at the perfor-
mative aspects of words are not useful.
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Richard B. Kuhns
June 23
Craig Callen suggests that it is unwise to treat performative verbal activity as
nonhearsay because such an approach "tends to conflate the definition of hearsay
with the exceptions."1 By this statement I take it he means that it is preferable to
rely on an exception to the hearsay rule rather than a limitation on the definition
of hearsay to find the performative activity admissible. I do not understand why
that should be the case.
Both the definition of hearsay itself and most of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule are based on the notion that one should exclude evidence only when there
are substantial hearsay dangers. Thus, for example, nonassertive nonverbal con-
duct (nonhearsay), excited utterances (exception), and dying declarations (excep-
tion) are admissible largely because of the presumed absence of a sincerity prob-
lem. Similarly, the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 801
demonstrates an intent to exclude from the definition of hearsay verbal activity
that the Advisory Committee analogizes to nonassertive nonverbal conduct.2
Analytically, it would make no difference if the Advisory Committee had includ-
ed nonassertive nonverbal conduct within the definition of hearsay, crafted an
exception for nonassertive nonverbal conduct, and included its comments about
analogous verbal activity in the Note to that exception. In short, whether activity
implicating the hearsay dangers is admissible as nonhearsay or as an exception to
the hearsay rule depends on nothing more than the vagaries of the drafting
process.
Craig's substantive concern, as I understand it, is that he would prefer to
exclude all or most verbal activity implicating the hearsay dangers unless the
activity falls within some existing exception to the hearsay rule? That is the
Regina v. Kearley4 position and it is a defensible one. It is also a minority posi-
tion among the participants in this Symposium, and as I argued in my essay, not
the Federal Rules' position.'
If one starts with the premise, with which Craig disagrees, that some verbal
activity implicating the hearsay dangers should be admissible because it is analo-
gous to nonassertive nonverbal conduct, the critical question becomes what crite-
ria one should use in classifying verbal activity implicating the hearsay dangers
as (1) admissible or (2) admissible only if falling within one of the existing
hearsay exceptions. Because the Federal Rules offer very little guidance for
resolving this issue and because the variety of verbal activity is virtually infinite,
it is not surprising that the discussion here has generated disagreement. The dis-
agreement, however, is less significant than some of the rhetoric may indicate.
1. Craig R. Callen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 161 (1995) (responding to Richard
B. Kuhns).
2. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee's note.
3. See Callen, supra note 1, at 161.
4. See 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
5. Richard B. Kuhns, Implied Assertions and the Hearsay Rule, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 139 (1995).
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I suggested initially that an analytically sound way to deal with this issue was
to compare verbal activity to nonverbal activity with a focus on what the declar-
ant/actor was trying to assert. At the same time, however, I noted that both
determining a declarant/actor's intent and deciding what the requisite intent
should be were difficult, elusive questions. Roger Park takes a similar approach
by suggesting (1) that the focus should be on whether "the declarant was aware
that someone would find the declarant's words useful in inferring or remember-
ing the [proposed fact]" and (2) expressing ambivalence about how helpful this
approach might be.'
Chris Mueller's approach, it seems to me, is quite similar, at least to mine. His
focus on the performative aspects of verbal activity is an effort to articulate crite-
ria consistent with the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801 for deciding
when to classify verbal activity involving hearsay dangers as nonhearsay.' In
addition, Chris Mueller's approach (unlike Roger Park's and mine) has the bene-
fit of directing the judge's attention to factors that are at least a bit less elusive
than intent. As Roger Park said, "There never will be one [definition] that com-
pletely avoids puzzles and perplexities, especially in the world of hypotheticals." 8
Indeed, I find myself occasionally disagreeing with Roger Park's and Chris
Mueller's applications of their own tests. Moreover, I am not sure to what extent
their disagreements over specific cases are primarily a function of the different
approaches they articulate. The fact remains, though, that they are both trying to
do basically the same thing.
A possible difference between their approaches is that Chris Mueller's
approach, at least as he interprets it, may tend to place fewer instances of verbal
activity within the Federal Rules of Evidence's definition of hearsay than does
Roger Park's, as Roger Park interprets his approach. That possibility, even if
true, however, is not a good reason for suggesting, as both Craig Callen and
Roger Park have, that Chris Mueller's performative activity concept should be
limited to verbal conduct involving no hearsay dangers.' Such a suggestion in
Craig Callen's case is simply a reiteration of the English view that all or most
verbal activity implicating hearsay dangers should always be classified as
hearsay. In Roger Park's case, the suggestion appears to be simply a manifesta-
tion of a disagreement about the appropriate contours of the hearsay doctrine as
applied to verbal activity.
If the ultimate goal is to find an approach to implied assertions that is consis-
tent with the Federal Rules, I believe a reasonable argument can be made for
adopting a relatively narrow view of the kinds of verbal conduct implicating
hearsay dangers that should be classified as nonhearsay: Although the Advisory
6. Roger C. Park, The Definition Of Hearsay: To Each Its Own, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 125, 131 (1995).
7. See Christopher B. Mueller, Incoming Drug Calls and Performance Words: They're Not Just Talking
About It, Baron Parke!, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 117 (1995).
8. Park, supra note 6, at 132.
9. See Callen, supra note 1, at 161; Roger C. Park, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the
Hearsay Rule: How Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 160
(1995) (responding to Christopher B. Mueller).
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Committee's Note makes it clear that some verbal activity implicating hearsay
dangers should be excluded from the definition of hearsay,1" the lack of elabora-
tion in the Advisory Committee's Note coupled with the general exclusionary
thrust of the hearsay rule suggests that one should be reluctant to exempt verbal
conduct implicating hearsay dangers from the definition of hearsay. On the other
hand, the Advisory Committee's liberal approach to exempting nonverbal con-
duct from the definition of hearsay ("burden upon the party claiming that the
intention existed")11 coupled with the Committee's drawing the analogy between
nonverbal conduct and implied assertions12 suggests that one need not take a nar-
row view of the extent to which implied assertions should be exempted from the
definition of hearsay.
Either Chris Mueller's elaboration of performative conduct or Roger Park's
elaboration of assertion could be applied to accommodate either view of the
extent to which implied assertions should be nonhearsay. If my sense is correct
that Roger Park's approach as he interprets it will classify more evidence as
hearsay than Chris Mueller's approach as he interprets it, Roger Park's approach
may be a slightly better vehicle for achieving a narrow scope in the category of
nonhearsay implied assertions. The case for taking a narrow view of the extent
to which implied assertions should be exempted from the definition of hearsay,
however, is far from compelling. Moreover, I am persuaded that Ron Allen, Rich
Friedman, and Eleanor Swift are on the right track in calling for a major liberal-
ization and/or reconception of the hearsay rule. 3 One of the significant benefits
of Chris Mueller's approach is that it tends to move the hearsay doctrine in the
direction that their views would take it.
Craig R. Callen
June 23
This is my response to Dick Kuhn's message. Dick wrote:
Craig Callen suggests that it is unwise to treat performative verbal activity as
nonhearsay because such an approach "tends to conflate the definition of
hearsay with the exceptions." By this statement I take it he means that it is
preferable to rely on an exception to the hearsay rule rather than a limitation on
10. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Ronald J. Allen, Rules, Logic, and Judgment, 16 Miss. C. L. RE. 61 (1995); Richard D. Friedman,
Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or Should) the Supreme
Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 87 (1995) (responding to Ronald J. Allen and Alex Stein);
Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 75 (1995).
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the definition of hearsay to find the performative activity admissible. I do not
understand why that should be the case.1
My point is two-fold. Dick's insightful synthesis of his approach with Chris
Mueller's performativity analysis does not seem to fit with the Federal Rules'
approach. Under his analysis, routine entries of computer data in business
records (and perhaps all business records) would be nonhearsay. In light of Rule
803(6), it is extremely doubtful that the drafters or Congress intended Rule 801 's
definition of hearsay to treat business records as nonhearsay.
The second point has to do with the nature of rule systems. There is a mathe-
matical proof (albeit in relatively informal form) that shows that a system of
rules composed of a general rule, subject to exceptions, which are themselves
subject to exceptions, is a very efficient way of modeling a decision-making
task, greatly superior to reliance on a flexible general standard, such as Rule 403,
standing alone.2 The hearsay rule and its exceptions are a system comprised of a
general rule with exceptions, etc. Dick's synthesis implies that Rule 803(6) sub-
stantially duplicates the definition of hearsay. I suspect that the synthesis might
treat statements within a number of exceptions as performative, such as those
which satisfy 803(4) - (6), (8), (9), (11) - (16) and (21) - (23). (At least it is not
clear that the statements within such exceptions are not performative in their
sense.) That degree of duplication would make the hearsay rules a less effective
means of conveying information about the decision-making process that
Congress or the Court expects trial judges to follow. My point is not that state-
ments such as those in Regina v. Kearley3 should never be admissible. It is
rather, that, if we classify those statements as nonhearsay, and make the rules a
worse device for conveying information, we impose a lot of unnecessary costs on
the system and the parties. Dick said:
Craig's substantive concern, as I understand it, is that he would prefer to exclude
all or most verbal activity implicating the hearsay dangers unless the activity
falls within some existing exception to the hearsay rule. That is the Kearley
position and it is a defensible one. It is also a minority position among the par-
ticipants in this Symposium, and as I argued in my essay, not the Federal Rules
position.4
Three points in response:
1. I don't have any difficulty admitting statements under residual exceptions,
although I might prefer that the exceptions were tightened up a bit, to deal with
the problems Myrna Raeder and others have pointed out. My reasons for prefer-
ring to treat the question of admissibility under the exception are those I gave in
the prior discussion.
1. Richard B. Kuhns, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 164 (1995) (responding to Craig R.
Callen).
2. J. HOLLAND ET AL., INDUCTION: PROCESS OF INFERENCE, LEARNING, AND DiscovERY 66-67 (1986).
3. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
4. Kuhns, supra note 1, at 164.
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2. John Jackson said, I believe, that he had the impression that most American
academics agree with Kearley.5 I doubt that that is the case, at least if the prose-
cution offers multiple calls. Most would consider it hearsay, I think. If the issue
is the question posed to the Lords, whether a single call would be hearsay, I think
a majority of American academics might agree with the Lords. Finally, although
the result of my position parallels Kearley, my reasons (heavy reliance on cogni-
tive science and Gricean pragmatics) are shared by only one other scholar at this
point, Professor Ron Shapira of Tel Aviv. So the position is really in the minority.
3. As I believe I said in response to Bob Mosteller's comment, I really doubt
that the Note to Rule 801(a) can be read to support a literalist interpretation of
variants of the word "assert" without treating the plain meaning of the words as
governed wholly by the McCormick/Wigmore side of the debate over the com-
mon law definition of hearsay. And, even if one adopts such a plain meaning
argument, it does not fit what we know about the process of communication in
the empirical world. Quoting Dick again:
I suggested initially that an analytically sound way to deal with this issue was to
compare verbal activity to nonverbal activity with a focus on what the declar-
ant/actor was trying to assert. At the same time, however, I suggested that both
determining a declarant/actor's intent and deciding what the requisite intent
should be were difficult, elusive questions. Roger Park takes a similar approach
by suggesting (1) that the focus should be on whether "the declarant was aware
that someone would find the declarant's words useful in inferring or remember-
ing the [proposed fact]," and (2) expressing ambivalence about how helpful this
approach might be.'
Roger's test here seems to me to have the same result as my test, to which he
refers in his essay. The only difference is Roger's treatment of Wright v. Tatham.7
Dick seems, in his comment and his essay, very reluctant to allow the hearsay
classification of implied assertions to rely heavily on the court's view of whether
the declarant intended to convey the proposition for which the utterance is
offered. The difficulty with Dick's argument is that the propositions which an
utterance conveys depend on the utterer's intent, insofar as the circumstances
tend to indicate that intent. If someone were to ask me if I thought Robert Dole
was dangerously liberal, I might say "Oh, sure," in jest. The circumstances
(whether in this discussion, or from my tone of voice in conversation) manifest
my intent to convey the exact opposite of the typical meaning of the words "Oh,
sure." The audience would normally infer my disagreement with the criticism of
Dole without even reflecting.
Questions of intent are unavoidable when determining whether an utterance
positively communicates a proposition. They may be difficult. Employing either
5. John Jackson, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 185, 186 (1995).
6. Kuhns, supra note 1, at 165.
7. See 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
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(i) the criterion for intent that I called general intent in the Foreword,' or (ii)
using the intent criterion that Chris Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick use in their
book,' will greatly simplify the problems. It is, concededly, unlikely that any
hearsay definition will resolve all the problems. If we ignore questions of intent,
though, we have abandoned any real effort to make the distinction between




This message contains a response to Craig's comments on my previous mes-
sage. First, however, a general observation about the utility of traditional hearsay
analysis:
Commentators who want to limit the extent to which implied assertions are
characterized as nonhearsay sometimes focus on the fact that implied assertions
may have substantial hearsay dangers other than insincerity. These observations
are correct, but in terms of traditional hearsay analysis they miss the mark.
Nonassertive nonverbal conduct may have substantial hearsay dangers other than
insincerity. For example, as I suggested in my earlier discussion of the sea cap-
tain hypothetical, the captain, knowing the ship was unseaworthy, may have been
responding to a medical emergency; the captain may not have seen the poor con-
dition of the ship; or the captain, by the time of embarking, may have forgotten
the poor condition of the ship.' Nonassertive nonverbal conduct nonetheless is a
category of evidence that receives nonhearsay treatment under the Federal
Rules.2
Traditional hearsay analysis applies the same type of categorical approach to
verbal assertions that clearly falls within the definition of hearsay. No matter
how free from hearsay dangers a statement appears to be, once it is classified as
hearsay it will be inadmissible unless it happens to fall within one of the excep-
tions. (The Federal Rules of Evidence residual exceptions provide some flexibil-
ity. There is disagreement, however, about how broadly to interpret those excep-
tions. Unfortunately, in my view, the legislative history suggests that a relatively
narrow interpretation is appropriate.)
8. Craig R. Callen, Foreword to the First Virtual Forum, Wallace Stevens, Blackbirds and the Hearsay Rule,
16 Miss. C. L. REv. 1 (1995).
9. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KiRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 8.12 (1995).
1. Richard B. Kuhns, Implied Assertions and the Hearsay Rule, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 139, 142 (1995).
2. FED. R. EVID. 801.
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Similarly, once a hearsay statement falls within an exception, the hearsay rule
will not be a bar to admissibility despite the presence of substantial hearsay dan-
gers. For example, excited utterances or dying declarations, even if sincere, may
have substantial perception problems; state of mind declarations, even if appar-
ently free from perception and memory problems, may have substantial sincerity
problems.
Just as there is nothing about nonassertive nonverbal conduct that tends to
ensure an absence of hearsay dangers other than insincerity, there is nothing
about excited utterances that tends to ensure the absence of hearsay dangers other
than insincerity (and perhaps poor memory); there is nothing about dying decla-
rations that tends to ensure the absence of hearsay dangers other than insincerity;
and there is nothing about state of mind declarations that tends to ensure the
absence of hearsay dangers other than misperception and poor memory. In short,
in each of these situations the classification that precludes the hearsay rule from
being a bar to admissibility does not ensure that all hearsay dangers will be mini-
mal; and in some instances the hearsay dangers may be substantial.
To be consistent with this traditional mode of hearsay analysis one should ask
(as the Advisory Committee suggests and as I argued in my essay) the following
question about implied assertions: Does the fact that the evidence is being
offered to prove something other than what the declarant is apparently intending
to assert tend to ensure the absence of a sincerity problem in the same way that
the nonassertiveness of apparently nonassertive nonverbal conduct tends to
ensure the absence of a sincerity problem?3 If the answer to this question is yes,
the evidence should be nonhearsay despite the presence of hearsay dangers other
than insincerity.
The significant insight of those who find serious hearsay dangers other than
insincerity in some implied assertions is that the traditional mode of hearsay
analysis is not very satisfactory. As I have just indicated, however, the inadequa-
cies of the traditional mode of analysis are not limited to the implied assertion
context. Furthermore, there is nothing about the manner in which traditional,
categorical hearsay analysis applies to implied assertions that makes it less satis-
factory in that context than in other contexts. If one is dissatisfied with the tradi-
tional analysis (which I think we all should be), the answer is not to tinker with
implied assertions. Rather, the answer is either to take the type of approach to
analyzing the admissibility of hearsay that Eleanor Swift advocates4 or to go fur-
ther, as Ron Allen and Rich Friedman advocate, and dismantle the hearsay rule.'
3. See Kuhns, supra note 1, at 139.
4. See Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 75 (1995).
5. See Ronald J. Allen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 91, 92 (1995) (responding to
Richard D. Friedman); Richard D. Friedman, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay
Rule: How Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 94 (1995)
(responding to Ronald J. Allen and Alex Stein).
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Now to the specific responses to Craig:
As a result of my failure to address the business records point that Craig raised
in his reply to my initial comment,6 I think he has misunderstood my position.
Except in what I regard as a trivial sense, my approach to implied assertions does
not conflate the definition of hearsay with the business records exception (in
Craig's bank card hypothetical) or with other exceptions. For example, as the
Federal Rules seem clearly to provide, specific assertions in business records
offered to prove the truth of those assertions would be hearsay under my
approach. These hearsay statements, as Craig observed, may be admissible pur-
suant to the business records exception. The communications sent to the cus-
tomer in Craig's hypothetical would never fall within the business records excep-
tion. Because they were sent to the customer, they cannot qualify as records kept
in the ordinary course of the bank's business. The bank employees' activity in
processing the records, however, is unlikely to be intended by the employees as
an assertion of any particular fact in the records.
What the preceding analysis demonstrates is merely that there is more than one
way to prove the customer's address in Craig's hypothetical. The first way is to
introduce into evidence the bank's records as business records. This approach
would require, first, relying on the admissions exemption to get over the hearsay
hurdle from the customer to the bank employee(s) and, second, laying the foun-
dation for the business records exception to get over the hearsay hurdle from the
bank employee(s) to the actual record. In terms of hearsay dangers, the primary
justification for admitting business records is that the combination of routine
recording and reliance by the business tends to ensure the sincerity of the
records. To a lesser extent these factors may minimize perception problems. In
addition, the time requirement of the business records exception tends to mini-
mize memory problems.
The second way to prove the customer's address is to introduce the data sent
from the bank to the customer. This approach would also require relying on the
admissions exemption to get over the hearsay hurdle from the customer to the
bank employees. The data sent to the customer, although not a business record,
would be nonhearsay on the ground that the production of that data by the bank
employees, like the production of the letters in Wright v. Tatham,7 was the kind of
verbal activity that the Federal Rules exempt from the definition of hearsay. In
terms of hearsay dangers, the primary justification for admitting evidence of the
bank employees' activity is the likely absence of a sincerity problem due to the
fact that the employees were probably not intending to assert, "Hey, everybody, I
want you to know that Customer lives at (whatever the address is)."
Of course, the lack of an intent to assert the customer's address is not the only
thing that tends to ensure the sincerity of the bank employees' activity. In addi-
6. Craig R. Callen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach'and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 161 (1995) (responding to Richard
B. Kuhns).
7. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
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tion, the same situational factors that tend to ensure the reliability of business
records are present: the routine nature of the activity, the relative contemporane-
ity of the employees' activity, and the bank's reliance on its own records of iden-
tical content. Pursuant to the traditional, categorical approach to hearsay that I
described above, however, these added guarantees of trustworthiness are irrele-
vant - just as in the sea captain hypothetical it is irrelevant to the nonhearsay
classification of the evidence whether the sea captain had good eyesight, may
have forgotten how unseaworthy the ship was during a long time lapse between
inspection and embarking, or may not have embarked at all. Regardless of these
variables, the captain was probably not intending to assert that the ship was sea-
worthy, and that is what counts - and all that counts - for hearsay purposes
under the Federal Rules. Similarly, for hearsay purposes all that matters with
respect to the bank employees under a traditional hearsay analysis is whether
they were intending to assert what the customer's address was. (In either case,
the variables may become important in determining whether Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 should preclude admissibility.)
A third possible route to admissibility in the bank card hypothetical would be
to rely on the analysis in (2) above, but to utilize bank records rather than the
data sent to the customers. This possibility may be what Craig has in mind when
he speaks of conflating the definition of hearsay with the exceptions to the
hearsay rule.8 I see no reason to be concerned about such a conflation, however.
First, I doubt that this type of situation will often arise. A litigant always has
an incentive to present the strongest possible evidence. Because, in my view, the
conditions required for the business records exception tend to provide stronger
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness than the mere likelihood that the
employees were not trying to assert or communicate the customer's address, I
suspect that a litigant's first choice would be to use the bank's records and to lay
the appropriate business records foundation. Second, and more fundamentally, I
see no reason to be troubled by the fact that there are several routes to proving
the customer's address in the bank card hypothetical. There frequently will be
more than one way to prove a particular fact. For example, one may prove a per-
son's presence at the scene of a crime with fingerprint evidence or with eye-wit-
ness identification testimony. Even when one is dealing with a single piece of
evidence there may be more than one route to admissibility. For example, with a
writing, one may be able to lay the foundation for either the business records
exception or the past recollection recorded exception (or both); a statement may
be both an admission and a declaration for the purposes of medical treatment or
an excited utterance and a present sense impression (or even all four).
There may occasionally be a good reason to foreclose to a litigant one means
of proof because another means happens to exist. For example, some type of
best evidence rule approach to hearsay arguably would be appropriate for avail-
able declarants, at least in the context of concerns over a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights. That issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
8. See Callen, supra note 6, at 161.
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Craig also said that I seemed reluctant to rely on a court's assessment of the
declarant's intent in classifying implied assertions as hearsay or nonhearsay.9 On
this point, I admit some ambivalence. As I argued in my initial essay, the appro-
priate approach under the Federal Rules is to compare implied assertions with
nonassertive nonverbal conduct, and analytically the key to such a comparison is
to focus on what the declarant/actor was intending to communicate.10 Indeed,
that is the focus of my discussion of why the bank employees' activity should be
nonhearsay.
At least for me the question of intent is a relatively easy one to answer in the
bank card hypothetical, as it is in Wright. In other cases, however, I find that the
question is more difficult. As I have pointed out, (1) not only is it often hard to
ascertain actual intent, but (2) it is also unclear what the requisite intent standard
should be: How direct or immediate or in the forefront of one's mind must the
proposition that the evidence is offered to prove be in order to classify the evi-
dence as hearsay? In light of these difficulties - particularly the latter one - I
am skeptical that a focus on intent will promote consensus or consistency in
dealing with implied assertions.
Craig R. Callen
July 10
This is a word on behalf of a non-traditional understanding of hearsay, one I've
discussed more fully elsewhere.'
I justify (or rationalize) this otherwise cheap self-promotion in two ways.
First, I'm not sure whether Dick Kuhns was commenting on that work in his last
message.2 In that message, he said that those who are dissatisfied with tradition-
al analysis should not "tinker with implied assertions" but rather should use the
sort of approach that Eleanor Swift uses, or dismantle the rule as Ron Allen
advocates?
I would have thought that comment directed to my analysis of the role of intent
in analysis of implied assertions had Dick not said in his initial essay that he was
aware of nothing in either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the literature of
implied assertions that grapples with the question how direct or immediate or
9. Callen, supra note 6, at 161-62.
10. See Kuhns, supra note 1, at 141-42.
1. See Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VANO. L. REv. 43 (1994).
2. See Richard B. Kuhns, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 169 (1995) (responding to
Craig R. Callen).
3. Id. at 170.
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conscious the intent to assert the proposition that the evidence is being offered
to prove should be in order to classify the evidence as hearsay.'
That indicates that he might not have viewed my article the way I did, or, alter-
natively, might not have meant to refer to it in his last comment. In either event,
it indicates my ideas may not have seeped into the collective consciousness. (On
the other hand, his reliance on traditional theory in his last comment may have
been in response to my mention of Gricean analysis in earlier messages.)
Second, the analysis of intent also relates to a point Margaret Berger made
about the officers' interaction with callers in Regina v. Kearley,5 and indirectly to
Nancy King's query about the status of implied assertions under the
Confrontation Clause.6
Communication, particularly oral communication, depends heavily on a set of
conventions, known in a number of disciplines as Grice's maxims. Without such
simplifying strategies, we could not successfully convey the amount of informa-
tion that our communications convey with the limited number of words that we
use. Those maxims are (i) that the speaker should be neither more nor less infor-
mative than necessary; (ii) the utterance should relate to the purpose of the par-
ties to the communication; (iii) the speaker should be perspicuous: orderly, brief,
and clear; (iv) the speaker should try to make her contribution true.7 As far as I
am aware (and if I can rely on criteria from another area of controversy in evi-
dence) the theory is generally accepted in a number of disciplines, testable and
confirmed by empirical research.
Margaret Berger made the point that the officers in Kearley could have
engaged in conduct that caused the callers to utter implied assertions.8 I can base
a good illustration of the effect of the maxims on her point. An officer who
answered the door of Kearley's flat, and asked the caller "What do you want?"
would be quite likely to receive a response such as "Is Chippie here? I need to
buy some drugs," if (i) the caller had merely heard Kearley was dealing, (ii)
believed Kearley knew where drugs were available (in Kearley, Kearley's wife
and their lodger pleaded guilty of unlawful possession and he argued that they
were the ones dealing), or (iii) had purchased drugs in the past from Kearley. In
any of those cases, the response would conform to the maxims by being brief and
to the point. Since the officer asked what the caller wanted, sources and contents
of the caller's beliefs would be, in the caller's eyes, relatively irrelevant to the
apparent purposes of the person answering the door.
Nevertheless, the caller would wish the person answering the door to infer that
the caller had an adequate basis for believing that Kearley could be of help in the
4. Richard B. Kuhns, Implied Assertions and The Hearsay Rule, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 139, 147 (1995).
5. See 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
6. See Margaret A. Berger, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 103 (1995) (responding to
Nancy J. King); Nancy J. King, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 100 (1995).
7. PAUL GrICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 74 (1989).
8. Berger, supra note 6, at 104.
[VOL. 16:1
ELECTRONIC DISCUSSION
caller's effort to obtain drugs. (Even if one of the callers wished to deceive the
person who answered the door or phone, the deceiver would wish his or her audi-
ence to infer that the deceiver had an adequate reason to believe Kearley had
access to, or information about, drugs.) Police operations such as the one in
Kearley may well be particularly fruitful sources of utterances that might be
classed as implied assertions. It seems likely that, unless an undercover officer
wanted to (i) take the risk of making a caller very suspicious by specific or
numerous questions, or (ii) detain the caller for questioning, most efforts that the
officer would make to obtain information from the caller would result in implied
assertions by the caller. (Additionally, as repeat players, police are likely to
know if implied assertions are admissible and tactically helpful to the prosecu-
tion, and, if so, to strive to obtain such evidence.)
Communication not only depends on the conventions, but on the parties' recog-
nition and reliance, implicit or explicit, upon them. There is, accordingly, one
core danger, of which the classic four dangers are aspects (but not aspects that
can exist in isolation from each other). A speaker, writer, or communicative
actor implicitly claims compliance with Grice's maxims (or cooperation in
Gricean terms) in the act of communication. The factfinder's difficulty in
assessing the accuracy of that claim is the central danger in evaluating hearsay
evidence. The speaker intends to convey conformity with the maxims, and the
propositions such conformity entails, in the same way that one intends to follow
the rules of baseball when playing. A base runner, for example, may not reflect
on any particular rule or rules when deciding to continue running to second base
after touching first, and may not even specifically or consciously follow any rule.
Nevertheless, in any real sense, the player intends to follow the rules.
Under this theory, the factfinder's task in evaluation of implied assertions dif-
fers not from the evaluation of express assertions (each turns on measuring the
extent of the speaker's compliance with the implicit assurance of cooperation)
but rather from the evaluation of non-communicative conduct, classically known
as non-assertive nonverbal conduct. Implied assertions are not necessarily more
reliable than express assertions - their probative value is equally dependent on
the accuracy of the speaker's implicit claim. In contrast, non-communicative
conduct makes no implicit claim of cooperation to the person who perceives the
conduct. Accordingly, the inferential problems it poses differ from those com-
municative conduct might raise.
The point of treating implied assertions as hearsay is not to make them inad-
missible, any more than the goal of including electronic recordings in "writings"
in Rule 1001 is to make electronic recordings inadmissible. Nor would the point
of treating implied assertions as subject to confrontation analysis be to make
them inadmissible. Instead, it is simply to set up a system that treats similar
inferential tasks, and thus similar evidentiary problems, in a coherent and consis-
tent fashion, in light of implied assertions' role in inference at trial. Similarly, I
do not think that anyone believes that the conclusion that a statement satisfies the
conditions for an exception entails the conclusion that the hearsay admitted pre-
sents no danger. Instead, I would think it more likely that the basis for the excep-
tions (setting aside Rules 803(7) and (10)) is that the facts which satisfy the
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exceptions show that the statement is nevertheless worth evaluating on the data
the court has in the particular case, even though some degree of inferential risk
may be present.
Dick Kuhns made an argument under the conventional theory that might be
used as a response to my distinction between implied assertions and non-commu-
nicative conduct? One can argue that neither implied assertions nor non-com-
municative conduct pose a sincerity risk, in that a speaker who meant to deceive
by a statement or action would articulate a false proposition. As Chris Mueller
pointed out in an earlier article, this assumes that deceivers would not attempt to
deceive by indirection, which is a dubious empirical proposition at best.
Professor Imwinkelried argues in another article that the common law's concern
with the sincerity danger was misplaced, and in any event, the structure of the
Federal Rules reflects concern with other dangers as well.
Finally, it is true that the letters in the hypotheticals that Chris, Dick and I have
been kicking around, and the callers' utterances in Kearley, would not be admis-
sible under traditional exceptions - indeed, that is why I put the banking hypo-
thetical to Chris in response to the discussion of Singer and performative speech
in their new hornbook. But classifying the letters or the Kearley statements as
nonhearsay, (on the theory that they are worthwhile evidence that need not fit
within traditional exceptions to be admitted) simply exempts such evidence from
two requirements of the residual exceptions. Those requirements are: (i) notice
and (ii) that such evidence be "more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts." The latter requirement looks a good deal like the sort of best evidence
device that Dick showed some willingness to consider favorably in his last com-
ment.1" The notice requirement does not seem sufficiently onerous to require the
creation of trapdoors in Rule 801 (a) or (c). In a case like Kearley, it would mere-
ly operate as a minimal version of the restraints on such evidence that Margaret
Berger and John Jackson have advocated:11 it would require, for example, the
prosecution to give notice before offering evidence such as that which the prose-
cution offered in Kearley.
9. Kuhns, supra note 2, at 169.
10. Kuhns, supra note 2, at 172.
11. Margaret A. Berger, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. Rlv. 99 (1995) (responding to Alex
Stein); John Jackson, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or





Direct assertions, implied assertions, and nonassertive nonverbal conduct all
require the factfinder to make similar inferences. Only direct assertions are
clearly hearsay, however, and nonassertive nonverbal conduct is not hearsay. The
extent to which implied assertions should be hearsay depends - in my view and,
I think, in Craig Callen's view - on comparing relevant similarities between
implied assertions, direct assertions, and nonassertive nonverbal conduct.
Craig places heavy emphasis on communicative intent to classify implied
assertions as hearsay, even when the verbal conduct is offered to prove unspoken
points.1 In his Vanderbilt article he correctly points out that implied assertions
are analogous to garden variety hearsay (and unlike nonassertive nonverbal con-
duct) in that the speaker in both cases is trying to communicate something.2 As a
result of these common communicative aspects (which, in his terms, require that
the factfinder "make inferences about the speaker's goals and implicit assurance
of the statement's utility and . . . evaluate the communication in that light"),3
Craig concludes that (almost) all implied assertions, including the letter writing
in Wright v. Tatham,4 should be hearsay.'
I believe that a more appropriate analogy is between implied assertions and
nonassertive nonverbal conduct. The latter are by definition nonhearsay and the
former should be as well when the absence of an intent to assert the proposition
that the evidence is offered to prove tends to eliminate the danger of insincerity.
The Advisory Committee Note's reference to verbal conduct seems to support
this view, although the Note is somewhat cryptic and could be interpreted in
other ways.8 I agree with Craig's observation in the Vanderbilt article that there
is no express indication of congressional intent on the subject at hand.7
In terms of which approach is preferable, my rhetorical question is this: In
view of (1) the strong analogy between nonassertive nonverbal conduct and some
implied assertions and (2) the fact that substantial hearsay dangers can inhere in
both nonassertive nonverbal conduct and statements falling within hearsay
exceptions, why should one be so anxious to classify (almost) all implied asser-
tions as hearsay? In order to answer that question affirmatively, it seems to me
one must accept two propositions. First, the risk that the factfinder may not be
able to evaluate accurately the relevant communicative aspects of implied asser-
tions is so great that even implied assertions with minimal insincerity dangers
1. Craig R. Callen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 173, 174 (1995) (responding to
Richard B. Kuhns).
2. Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1994).
3. Id. at 92.
4. See 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
5. Callen, supra note 2, at 82.
6. See FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee's note.
7. Callen, supra note 2, at 82 n.175.
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should be inadmissible unless they fall within an existing exception to the
hearsay rule. Second, the existing exceptions to the hearsay rule provide an ade-
quate, reasonably coherent approach to the admissibility of declarations with
hearsay dangers. I do not believe that either proposition is sound.
Laird C. Kirkpatrick
July 12
I apologize for entering this discussion so late, but I just returned from Japan
where I have been since the papers were initially distributed. It is interesting to
see such diversity of opinion about how Regina v. Kearley1 would be decided
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the even broader range of views about
how evidence law should treat implied assertions. The range of thought
expressed (from abandoning the hearsay rule to expanding the definition of
hearsay to include most evidence dependent on the credibility of the declarant or
actor) suggests that the Federal Rules of Evidence drafters adopted a middle-of-
the-road position in limiting hearsay to verbal assertions or nonverbal conduct
"intended as an assertion." Because the Advisory Committee's Note says that
"nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one,"' Federal Rule of Evidence
801 gives us a hearsay definition that necessarily depends on the intent of the
declarant. As several contributors to this Symposium have discussed, the prob-
lem with this approach is that it is often difficult for courts to determine precise-
ly what the declarant intended to assert, or (as Richard Kuhns perceptively noted)
how conscious that intent must be.3
Yet we should not overestimate the difficulty of this issue as compared to the
questions that arise under other possible formulations of the hearsay standard.
Courts under modem codes already have experience in using an intent standard
to draw the line between nonverbal conduct that is hearsay (because assertive)
and conduct that is not. Arguably, it is not significantly more difficult to use the
intent standard to determine when verbal conduct is hearsay. (It is true that for
nonverbal conduct, the Advisory Committee simplified the administration of the
rule and tipped the balance in favor of admissibility by placing the burden on the
objecting party to prove that an assertion was intended.)4
The issue I would like to pursue, using hypotheticals from this Symposium, is
whether the concept of performativity can assist courts in determining whether
verbal conduct offered to prove what the speaker or actor apparently believes is
hearsay. (I am deliberately avoiding use of the term "implied assertion," because
1. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H. L. Eng. 1992).
2. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
3. See Richard B. Kuhns, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 169, 170 (1995) (respond-
ing to Craig R. Callen).
4. FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee's note.
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under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) an assertion is defined by the Advisory
Committee's Note as an "intended"' assertion - and in applying Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 the communicative intent of the declarant is often the exact matter
at issue.)
The fundamental concept is this: It is a mistake to view words and conduct as
two distinct categories for purposes of hearsay analysis. Words are a form of
conduct. It is more useful to view words in their assertive aspect and
nonassertive conduct as occupying opposite ends of the spectrum comprised of
human behavior. Sometimes the words in their assertive aspect dominate, in
light of the point to be proved, and we have no problem classifying the words as
assertive (hence possibly hearsay). Other times the assertive aspect is incidental
or unimportant, and the behavioral aspect of what the person did is far more
important in light of the point to be proved. In the mixed words/conduct cases,
the question is whether the evidence is closer to one end of the spectrum or the
other. Although the degree of performativity does not conclusively resolve
whether the evidence is hearsay, it can be a useful and easily applied criterion for
courts to evaluate. Consider the following examples:
1. If the government wishes to prove that Carlos Almaden resides in Apt. 412,
it would clearly be hearsay for an FBI agent to testify that the apartment manager
told him Almaden lived in Apt. 412. It would clearly not be hearsay for the FBI
agent to testify that he gave the apartment manager a package for Almaden, the
manager agreed to deliver it, and then the agent surreptitiously followed him and
watched him deliver it to Apt. 412. What if the evidence is that after accepting
the package from the agent the manager wrote a note on it for one of his
employees "Deliver to Apt. 412." Is this act of addressing more like the verbal
assertion (and hence hearsay) or more like the actual act of delivery (and hence
not hearsay)? I would argue it is more like the latter.
2. David Seidelson posed the hypothetical of proving that Dean was drunk
when he drove away from a party by testimony about the words and conduct of
Jones, who had ridden with Dean to the party.6 It would clearly be hearsay for W
to testify that Jones told her: "I'd rather walk home than ride with Dean. He's
stinking drunk." But it would not be hearsay for W to testify that she saw Jones
walk home. What about testimony by W that she observed Jones decline Dean's
offer of a ride and instead call a cab? Is this more like a verbal assertion or a
nonassertive act? Again, I would argue it is more like the latter.
3. What about the facts of Kearley itself? Clearly it would be hearsay for a
police informant to testify that he was told by several people in the neighborhood
that "Kearley is a drug dealer." But it would not be hearsay to offer evidence that
several people came to the doorwhile undercover police officers were there and
after paying large amounts of cash walked away with packages supposedly con-
taining drugs left for them by Kearley but which actually were empty. (This
5. Id.
6. David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Continuing Quandary for
Federal Courts, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 33, 44 (1995).
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would be powerful evidence that they had bought drugs from Kearley before and
trusted him enough that they didn't even need to open the packages.) What
about the attempts to purchase drugs by the various callers and visitors in the
actual case? Arguably such verbal conduct is closer to the act of making a pur-
chase than to an assertion about Kearley's activities, which is why most United
States courts admit such evidence (often expressly characterizing the attempted
purchaser's activity as conduct not an assertion).
4. Finally, Alex Stein suggests in his essay that testimony by W that she
observed A and B greet each other should be admitted as nonhearsay to prove
acquaintance between A and B.7 I agree, partly because of the performative
nature of the activity. But performativity is only one factor to be considered and
does not resolve whether evidence is hearsay in all cases. Sometimes the
assertive aspects of a performative act predominate thereby requiring hearsay
treatment. For example, even though a social introduction ("Sandra, I'd like you
to meet Arthur") is performative in that it brings two people together and invites
further conversation between them, proving the introduction in order to establish
the name of the person introduced is likely to depend heavily on the assertive
content of the words of introduction (in effect, the speaker says "this person is
Arthur"). The performative aspect would not suffice to prove the name, and the




How much weight do the phone calls in Regina v. Kearley deserve? If anyone
has the audacity to answer that question, I will ask the person to explain how he
or she knows. Second, how do we know, whatever weight the phone calls
deserve, whether the jury will over or under value it? If we do not know the
answers to these questions, how can we keep such evidence out of the process
designed to determine what actually happened at the time in question? Note, by
the way, that we do not know these answers applied to virtually any evidentiary
proffer at trial. That, in large measure, is why we have a trial. If the evidence in
Kearley looks pretty much like run of the mill evidence, it should be admitted, it
seems to me.
7. Alex Stein, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 55, 57 (1995) (responding to David
E. Seidelson).





What do the various definitions of hearsay discussed in this Forum require of
judicial decisionmaking? A judge's competence to apply the definitions ought to
figure in our analysis. For now, I want to comment on the definition proposed by
Chris Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick that embraces a concept they call "perfor-
mative" speech.' As I understand that definition, where speech is sufficiently
"performative," although not "operative," it should be non-hearsay even though
relevant for the truth of the beliefs of the speaker. Because this concept has cap-
tured some attention in this Forum, I think it important to try to capture the
meaning of it as well.
Roger Park urged Chris Mueller to "set forth a definition telling us what 'per-
formative' means. '  Roger agrees, I think, with Chris' point that most speech
both asserts things and does things. Roger sees that it will be difficult for judges
to grapple with the task given to them by Mueller and Kirkpatrick - the task of
differentiating between speech which should be treated as an assertion (and be
treated as hearsay) and speech which should be treated as performative (and be
treated as non-hearsay). As such, Roger must think that a definition will make
judges' tasks easier (or clearer).
Chris responded that performativity exists in speech when speech is "causing
things to happen, bringing into being or carrying on human relationships, or
changing the positions of declarant and others."' I doubt that this definition is
specific enough for Roger because, again, most speech between people probably
includes such performativity. However, Chris has further elaborated the concept,
although not exactly in definitional form.
In his essay, Chris says (in effect) that judges will be asking the right question
when they assess the importance of the performative aspect of speech by looking
at: (1) what the speaker is trying to accomplish by speaking, (2) what motivates
the speaker's behavior, and (3) how likely it is that he would do what he is doing
if the point to be proved were not so.4 Perhaps this can be boiled down further in
definitional terms to (1) an assessment of the speaker's intent (does he care more
about communicating something or doing something), (2) an assessment of the
degree of reliance involved (why does he care), and (3) an assessment of the risk
of being wrong (would he do this if the point to be proved were not so). If these
are the right assessments, the performativity test is like an intent test (does the
speaker really care about communicating, thus affecting the sincerity risk) plus a
I. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE (1995).
2. Roger C. Park, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 152, 154 (1995) (responding to
Christopher B. Mueller).
3. Christopher B. Mueller, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 154, 155 (1995) (respond-
ing to Roger C. Park).
4. Christopher B. Mueller, Incoming Drug Calls and Performative Words: They're Not Just Talking About
It, Baron Parke!, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 117 (1995).
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reliability test (are there indications from the speaker's behavior that the speak-
er's beliefs are reliable, thus affecting the perception and memory risks).
This performativity inquiry may then be (in effect) trumped by the second
question that Chris says judges should ask: Does the point to be proved depend
too much on something that the words specifically assert, like names, addresses,
etc.?' Where relevance depends on such specificity in assertion, Chris thinks, I
believe, that the performative aspect of that same speech should not turn it into
nonhearsay.
What does this mean for judges' application of the "performative" definition?
First, it requires a very careful analysis of the relevance (the point to be proved)
of the speech. Then, it requires a careful analysis of context to evaluate on the
basis of generalizations from background knowledge and experience, the speak-
er's intent, motive, reliance, and risks in speaking. This is a very ad hoc, fact-
bound judgment. (So is a strictly "intent"-based definition.) I hope to say more
on this later.
In his comment, Laird Kirkpatrick states that there is a spectrum from perfor-
mative to assertive speech, and that the concept of performativity is a "useful and
easily applied criterion for courts to evaluate."6 He then takes us through a few
examples and states his conclusions as to where each example falls on this spec-
trum.7 But all he states is his view, not the analysis that a judge would have to
use to get to that conclusion. Thus, his examples are not yet fully persuasive of
the "ease" with which the concept of performativity can be applied.
With regard to example one, what if the manager's note said "Deliver to
[Almaden at] Apt. 12"? With regard to example two, is there really any differ-
ence in performativity between "walking home" and "calling a cab"? I would
argue both are ambiguous on the issue of Dean's drunkenness. Finally, with
regard to example three, in his essay, Chris Mueller has attempted to say why he
thinks that attempts to purchase drugs are more performative than assertive.8 But
what about the attempt to buy "the usual" from Chippie? Where does this fall on
the spectrum? Is this now like example four, where the assertive aspect domi-
nates?
5. Id.
6. Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 178, 179 (1995).
7. Id.





I would like to respond to Eleanor Swift's thoughtful comment of July 21.1 I
believe her analysis and attempt to further define "performativity" is quite help-
ful, particularly her suggested focus on whether the speaker "cares more about
communicating something or doing something."2 Eleanor raises the question
whether performativity adds a new level of complexity to hearsay analysis.3 I
would argue that it does not. I said in my last message that the criterion is "easi-
ly applied, 4 which I believe to be the case, but it is not a bright line or mechani-
cal test.' Balancing and measuring are involved, which of course is true many
places in hearsay analysis, including for many of the hearsay exceptions (such as
excited utterance, business records, and of course the catchall exceptions). Even
if there were general agreement that the degree of performativity bears on
whether verbal conduct should be classified as hearsay, not all judges or law pro-
fessors would necessarily reach the same conclusion in a given case, just as rea-
sonable minds can differ about precisely where the line is to be drawn between
character evidence and habit evidence.
One value of performativity analysis is that it challenges the dichotomy
between verbal assertions and nonverbal, nonassertive conduct. It allows courts
to view cases of mixed acts and words as being both verbal assertions and
nonassertive conduct. They do not have to be one or the other. As I type this
message, I am engaged in the physical act of moving my fingers over a computer
keyboard. That physical act is a component of assertive speech (the message I
am sending), but for other purposes it is properly classified as nonverbal,
nonassertive conduct. Presumably a colleague could testify that she saw me typ-
ing on this keyboard as evidence that the electricity was on in my office at the
time or that my computer was in working condition (because I apparently
believed it to be). Such evidence would not be hearsay under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801, because here the performative aspects of my conduct overwhelm
any assertive aspects.
An assessment of the degree of performativity is most useful for verbal con-
duct that falls in the middle of the spectrum between verbal assertions and non-
verbal, nonassertive conduct. If I state that it is hot in my office, my statement is
hearsay if it is offered to prove the truth of that assertion. If I get up and turn on
the air conditioner, evidence of this act is nonhearsay because it is nonassertive,
nonverbal conduct. What if I request someone else to turn on the air condition-
1. See Eleanor Swift, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 181 (1995) (responding to
Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 178, 179 (1995).
5. Id.
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er? Here, in making the hearsay analysis, it would be useful for a court (and I
would argue not difficult or complex) to assess whether such a request is more
like the direct verbal assertion or the nonverbal conduct of turning on the air con-
ditioner myself.
Eleanor posed some hypotheticals to me at the end of her message,8 and I
would respond as follows: (1) I would view a manager's note "Deliver to Apt.
12" as nonhearsay evidence that could be used by the defense to challenge the
prosecutor's claim that Almaden lives in Apt. 412; (2) While evidence that the
friend walked home or called a cab is ambiguous and certainly does not establish
that Dean was drunk, such evidence should be able to meet the Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 test of relevancy (at least if supported by the other contextual evi-
dence of the type suggested by David Seidelson, such as that the cab ride cost
$40, it was a five mile walk, Dean and declarant reside in same apartment build-
ing, there was no apparent other reason for refusing to ride with Dean);7 and (3)
Yes, I would view a request to buy "the usual" from Chippie as verbal conduct




This message is in response both to Ron Allen's response' to some exchanges I
had with Dick Kuhns, and to Eleanor Swift's last message.'
Ron asked whether anyone could establish the extent to which jurors might
overvalue hearsay? Further, if no one can establish (or is willing to specify) that
extent, he asks how one can justify excluding hearsay.4
One response is that one reason for excluding hearsay that is not accompanied
by "foundation facts" as Eleanor calls them,' or by facts sufficient to show that
the possible impact of the evidence warrants the effort, or costs, of evaluating it.
In other words, as I believe Eleanor put it, the exclusion is designed to help the
6. Swift, supra note 1, at 182.
7. David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Continuing Quandary for
Federal Courts, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 33, 44 (1995).
1. See Ronald J. Allen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. Rev. 180 (1995).
2. See Eleanor Swift, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 181 (1995).
3. Allen, supra note 1, at 180.
4. Allen, supra note 1, at 180.
5. Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 75 (1995).
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jury do its job by encouraging proffers accompanied by data that assist the jury.7
Another response stems from the analysis of Professor Kandel' in which she
relies heavily on a substantial literature in sociolinguistics, which analyzes
reported speech as "constructed dialogue,"9 and argues that such reports "create a
dramatic, emotional involvement between speaker and hearer and . . . shift
responsibility and blame from the speaker to the person 'quoted' "10 and allow
parents who tell stories that are constructions, rather than mere verbatim reports,
a "potently persuasive" tactic." While this scholarship does not address the
same inferential problem as the hearsay rules do, since it focuses on the witness'
accuracy, it shows that the difficulty of evaluating second-hand reports is not
merely a cobwebbed legal conjecture.
6. Id.
7. Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child Custody Mediation
and a Hearsay Analog Solution, 36 ARiz. L. RE. 879, 881, 898-902 (1994).
8. Id. at 881.
9. Id.
10. Id.
DISCUSSION: CHARACTER EVIDENCE; UNITED KINGDOM PERSPECTIVES
John Jackson
June 22
KEARLEY: HEARSAY, PROBATIVE VALUE AND FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS
In the spirit of Ron Allen's request to participants to be more spontaneous, I
have recorded some rather sporadic thoughts on the essays and comments so far.
(1) Reading the essays from this side of the Atlantic, I am struck by the degree
to which there is an enduring attachment to hearsay doctrine. With the exception
of Allen, the essays seem to admit the continuing need of a hearsay rule, and the
essayists are engaged to a large extent in the task of teasing out the proper scope
of the rule. The various models suggested- explicitness-based, dangers-based,
communication-intention-based, necessary implication-based and risk allocation-
based - are presented as solutions to this question, and Regina v. Kearley' is
used to illustrate how the models relate to the particular problem of implied
assertions.
On this side of the Atlantic, the problem of the proper scope of the hearsay rule
is also considered important, but there is more agreement on this issue. In par-
ticular there is more of a consensus that implied assertions should not be covered
by the rule. At least one of the majority in Kearley took this view, but for rea-
1. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
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sons pointed out by Ron Allen in his paper, their Lordships felt unable to change
the law.2 The decision was greeted with disappointment by most academic com-
mentators in the United Kingdom, whereas judging from the essayists, reaction
to the Kearley decision is much more mixed in the United States. There would
seem to be an ironic contrast to be made between case law and academic com-
mentary in the United States and the United Kingdom. As not infrequently hap-
pens, academic commentary in both countries is critical of the indigenous case
law, but for completely different reasons: in the United States the majority of
academic commentary would seem to support Kearley (again I can judge only
from what the essayists have said), in the United Kingdom most thought Kearley
was wrong. In the United Kingdom most academics appear to share Ron Allen's
view that here is a technical, silly rule being used to circumvent the admissibility
of perfectly probative evidence, the effect of which was to quash the conviction
of a clearly guilty defendant.' I am by no means so sure that Kearley was as
guilty as is assumed on the count brought against him (for reasons see infra), but
I share the view that the hearsay rule has operated in an unduly technical manner
and that it is increasingly dangerous for any legal system to apply rules that do
not make sense to lay persons. Kearley certainly goes against the tide of increas-
ing skepticism in the United Kingdom about the use of technical rules, such as
the hearsay rule to advance the aims of the law of evidence. As Rich Friedman
says, the rule is all but disappearing in civil cases (it has been abolished in
Scotland and has been recommended for abolition in England and Wales).'
Documentary hearsay is now increasingly admitted in criminal cases in England
and Wales as a result of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988. The Law Commission
is presently considering how much further the rule should be relaxed in criminal
cases, and it is not inconceivable that it will recommend virtual abolition in crim-
inal cases.
(2) I also, however, share the concern of a number of essayists about the need
to be fair to criminal defendants. Rich Friedman suggests that defendants need to
be protected against witnesses who have made statements in the knowledge that
it is likely to be used in the investigation of crime.' I would go further and say
that defendants need to be protected from all statements which are allegedly the
product of criminal investigation activity. The real danger in Kearley-type situa-
tions, which I do not think has been brought out sufficiently so far, was pointed
out by Lord Ackner at the end of his speech when he said:
Professor Cross ... stated that a further reason justifying the hearsay rule was
the danger that hearsay evidence might be concocted. He dismissed this as
'simply one aspect of the great pathological dread of manufactured evidence
which beset English lawyers of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.' Some
2. Ronald J. Allen, Rules, Logic, and Judgment, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 61 (1995).
3. See id.
4. Richard D. Friedman, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 MIss. C. L. REv. 87, 88 (1995).
5. Id.
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recent appeals, well known to your Lordships, regretfully demonstrate that cur-
rently that anxiety, rather than being unnecessarily morbid, is fully justified.'
Here, his Lordship is referring to a real concern that there has been in the United
Kingdom about the fabrication of police evidence which has led to a number of
miscarriages of justice. There is a particular danger of this in a Kearley-type of
situation. Here we had the police raiding the premises of a known drug dealer
only to find a very small quantity of drugs. There must have been real disap-
pointment, and in this situation, there is an obvious temptation to manufacture
evidence for the sake of what has been called here "noble cause corruption."
Whether the hearsay rule should have been used to prevent the admissibility of
the phone call evidence in Kearley is another matter. There is no concept of a
Confrontation Clause in the United Kingdom, but there is an argument that in
fairness to defendants' demands, only evidence obtained as a result of acceptable
police investigation practice should generally be used against defendants. This is
why I am attracted to Margaret Berger's proposal that the police should be
required to tape the messages they intercept in cases like Kearley or to demon-
strate that a reasonable effort was made to secure the declarant as a witness.7
(Rich Friedman asks whether detaining the persons who came to Kearley's resi-
dence might have posed an unreasonable risk to an ongoing investigation.8 But
how could it in this case? The police had already arrested Kearley who appeared
to be the police's main target.) All this would seem to be an application of the
best evidence principle to evidence against criminal defendants. One of the rea-
sons underlying such a principle would undoubtedly be the need to allocate risks
of error to the advantage of defendants to avoid the conviction of the innocent
(Alex Stein's concern).9 However, I think there is a broader fairness concern at
stake here and that is that defendants are entitled to be protected against potential
governmental abuse of power.
(3) Turning specifically to the issue of relevancy in Kearley, the legal argu-
ment in the case turned on the inferences that could be drawn from the phone
calls. I address this question in my commentary with Sean Doran and Adrian
Zuckerman on the Kearley case.1" As others have said, Kearley is principally a
decision about relevancy and not hearsay, as the question was whether assuming
the hearsay rule extends to implied assertions, the phone calls could be admitted
on any nonhearsay basis. I for one think that, taken at face value, the evidence of
the calls is primarily relevant by means of the implied assertion that the callers
believed Kearley was a drug dealer, but I accept what seems to be Eleanor
Swift's view that the fact of numerous callers means that it is possible to draw the
inference that Kearley was a drug dealer, other than by reliance on the testimoni-
6. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 258 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
7. Margaret A. Berger, How Would or Should the Supreme Court Interpret the Definitions in Rule 801?, 16
Miss. C. L. REv. 13, 20 (1995).
8. Friedman, supra note 4, at 90.
9. See Alex Stein, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 95, (1995) (responding to Richard
D. Friedman).
10. Sean Doran et al., Evidence, ALL E.R. ANN. REv. 145, 162-67 (1992).
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al qualities of the callers.11 In other words, assuming the hearsay rule applies to
implied assertions, the number of callers should make a difference to admissibili-
ty because this fact makes the fact that Kearley was a drug dealer more probable
on a nonhearsay basis. But there is a further relevancy question in the Kearley
case which was not raised in argument and which I have not seen raised any-
where else. Assuming the phone calls were made and that they could lead to the
inference that Kearley was a drug dealer, how relevant was this to what the pros-
ecution had to prove, namely that the small quantity of drugs that were found in
Kearley's possession were intended by Kearley to be supplied to others, contrary
to section 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971? (Is it not much more likely
that, although Kearley was heavily involved in drug dealing, the very small quan-
tity of drugs that were actually found were not to be used for this purpose?)
Assuming the evidence that Kearley was a drug dealer is relevant, is there any
way to prevent a real problem of prejudice here? The danger is not that a jury
might misestimate the probative value of the evidence, but might be jaundiced
towards Kearley when they knew he was a drug dealer with the result that they
would be more inclined to convict, no matter what the probative connection




Implied assertions of belief bear risks for rational decision making beyond
hearsay dangers. The risk of ambiguity in the implied assertions in Regina v.
Kearley1 generates an additional risk of impermissible reliance on character evi-
dence.
John Jackson raised an important relevance question in Kearley: How were the
callers' beliefs about Kearley relevant to what the prosecution had to prove -
namely that the drugs possessed by Kearley were intended by him to be supplied
to others?2 And did the calls violate the rule against using character to prove
conduct?3 In my essay, I argued that a prior act of Kearley's selling drugs would
be relevant to prove his intent.' This argument was premised on Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) and the reasoning in United States v. Beechum, that a defen-
11. See Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 MiSs. C. L. REv. 75, 76 (1995).
1. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
2. John Jackson, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 75, 78 (1995).
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dant's prior act (with an unlawful intent) makes it less likely that he had lawful
intent in the charged offense.5
Thus, it seems essential that the content of the callers' "implied assertion" of
belief must be about a prior act - that "Kearley sold drugs in the past." If the
implied assertion of belief is simply "Kearley is a drug dealer," then relevance
depends (more explicitly at least) on a character theory that "if he's a dealer, he's
dealing now, and intends to supply any drugs he possesses to others." This rea-
soning about character would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 404. If, instead,
the caller's implied assertion of belief can be articulated more specifically as a
prior act - "he has sold to me in the past" - then a line of reasoning under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), such as the Beechum intent theory, might be
permissible. (It should also be remembered that the majority in the House of
Lords rejected as irrelevant the callers' belief if articulated simply as "Kearley is
a drug dealer"; I think this was because of a lack of personal knowledge.)
The question I want to pose is, assuming a Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
theory of relevance premised on Kearley's prior act in which he indulged in the
same intent of "intending to supply others," whether the callers' statements alone
can satisfy the minimum requirements of Rule 404(b)? Moreover, are these
statements sufficient to support a finding under Rule 104(b) that Kearley did
engage in a prior specific uncharged act that requires the same intent as the
charged offense? It seems that this is doubtful. The callers' statements are
ambiguous because they are implied, not express, assertions of belief. The
callers might believe "Kearley is a dealer," or "Kearley sold drugs before," or
even "I have heard Kearley has sold drugs in the past." But can we really say that
the callers' statements prove a specific prior act by Kearley?
Some callers said they wanted "the usual" from Kearley. This is a more specif-
ic reference to a specific past event, but it also makes that caller's statement more
like an express assertion of that past event and thus hearsay. The ambiguity of
the implied assertions, which preserves their non-hearsay status, increases the
risk of impermissible reasoning about character.
Even if the Rule 104(b) and Rule 404(b) thresholds are met (assuming any
prior act of sale by Kearley would involve the same "intent to supply others"),
Rule 403 remains. As John Jackson points out, the jury is very likely to be
"jaundiced towards Kearley when they knew he was a drug dealer with the result
that they would be more inclined to convict, no matter what the probative con-
nection between the calls and the intent to supply the actual drugs found."6 This
is a substantial risk of unfair prejudice in a case involving such a small amount
of drugs and other possible flat-mates who might own them anyway.
As against this risk, what is the probative value of the alleged specific act of
past drug sale? Beechum holds that the overall similarity of the uncharged and
charged acts is an important component of probative value.7 We know nothing of
5. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911,913 (5th Cir. 1978).
6. Jackson, supra note 2, at 188.
7. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913-14.
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the overall similarity of the uncharged act(s) and the charged possession of a
small amount of amphetamine from the callers' statements. The callers could
have bought different drugs, bought different amounts, and bought at different
places. We also know nothing specific about the temporal proximity or remote-
ness of the uncharged acts. Again, because of the inherent ambiguity of implied
assertions of belief, probative value is extremely difficult to evaluate. All we are
left with, again, is the fact that a large number of callers impliedly asserted the
same belief about Kearley. If this is interpreted to mean that Kearley engaged in
a large number of prior sales, across a range of customers and contexts, then the
evidence loses its Rule 404(b) focus on specific intent and becomes much more
like proof of general character, prohibited by Rule 404.
Sharpening the analysis of what has to be proved in the Kearley case, namely, a
specific past act involving the same "intent to supply others," affects the applica-
tion of various hearsay definitions as well. If a Rule 403 type balancing test is
used to admit and exclude hearsay, I find that the implied assertions of the callers
are not very probative of a specific prior uncharged act. Therefore these asser-
tions would be inadmissible. If a "performative" definition is used, the caller's
behavior has to move closer to the "assertion" end of the spectrum and away
from the "performative" end of the spectrum in order to prove a specific prior
uncharged act which would therefore make it hearsay. If a specific intent test is
used, I find it hard to think that the caller has the specific intent to communicate
about a specific prior uncharged act, which would therefore be non-hearsay. If a
general communicative intent test is used, I find the question too close to call. If
the hearsay dangers test is used, it is still clearly hearsay.
Craig R. Callen
July 26
On Thursday, July 20, 1995, in discussing whether the Kearley utterances raise
Rule 404(b) concerns, Eleanor Swift wrote:
Sharpening the analysis of what has to be proved in the Kearley case, namely, a
specific past act involving the same "intent to supply others," affects the appli-
cation of various hearsay definitions as well. If a Rule 403 type balancing test
is used to admit and exclude hearsay, I find that the implied assertions of the
callers are not very probative of a specific prior uncharged act. Therefore these
assertions would be inadmissible. If a "performative" definition is used, the
caller's behavior has to move closer to the "assertion" end of the spectrum and
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away from the "performative" end of the spectrum in order to prove a specific
prior uncharged act which would therefore be hearsay. If a specific intent test is
used, I find it hard to think that the caller has the specific intent to communicate
about a specific prior uncharged act which would therefore be non-hearsay. If a
general communicative intent test is used, I find the question too close to call.
If the hearsay dangers test is used, it is still clearly hearsay.1
Insofar as general intent is concerned, the speaker generally intends to convey
that he or she has good grounds to believe the communication is relevant to the
hearer's purposes. In other words, the speakers, by making requests of the under-
cover officers for Chippie and for drugs, implicitly conveyed their opinions that
there would be good reason to believe that Chippie would be of assistance in
their effort to obtain drugs.2 (Of course the speaker or speakers who asked for
the "usual" intended to convey more information.) The utterances of the speak-
ers who made requests without referring to past transactions, then,, would be




As was widely predicted, the Law Commission's report on criminal hearsay
proposes further relaxation in the operation of the hearsay rule, recommending a
number of exceptions for first hand oral, as well as documentary hearsay, and
recommending also a limited inclusionary discretion (similar in structure to the
Federal Rules of Evidence in the United States) to admit hearsay falling outside
the recognized categories where the evidence is so positively and obviously trust-
worthy that the opportunity to test it by cross-examination can safely be dis-
pensed with.1
These are perhaps more modest proposals than had been anticipated. I have
already referred to the fact that the Law Commission has recommended the abo-
lition of the hearsay rule in civil cases,2 but I took the view in this report that dif-
ferent considerations apply in criminal proceedings. Of more immediate interest
to this Symposium, the Law Commission took note of the criticism of Regina v.
1. Eleanor Swift, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 188, 190 (1995) (responding to
John Jackson).
2. See Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
1. See Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics, Consultation
Paper No. 138 (1995). This test appears to be extracted from the Canadian Supreme Court case of Regina v.
Smith, 94 D.L.R.4th 590 (1992).
2. See Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics, Consultation
Paper No. 138 (1995).
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Kearley,3 and recommended that the hearsay rule should not extend to implied
assertions, adopting the view in Cross on Evidence4 that the presence of an inten-
tion to assert provides the most defensible watershed between hearsay and non-
hearsay, both as a matter of logical coherence and of practical common sense.'
As commentators in this Symposium have pointed out, the United States' expe-
rience suggests that this may not be as easy a watershed to apply, as is assumed.
But the intention of the Commission is clear: Kearley-type assertions should be
admissible subject to the common law discretion to refuse to admit prosecution
evidence, if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, and subject to
section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which gives the court a
statutory discretion to refuse to allow prosecution evidence which would have an
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings.6 If these recommendations are
followed, then it will become all the more important that the section 78 discretion
is developed, in the way I have argued, to control the admission of statements
which are the product of criminal investigation activity.
Certain commentators have said that after reading Kearley they are grateful for
a written Bill of Rights as this would have provided an explicit additional basis
for the Lords' decision in Kearley.7 Although the United Kingdom has never tra-
ditionally recognized a right to confrontation, the United Kingdom courts are
paying increasing attention to the European Convention on Human Rights and to
the jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
which requires proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which evidence
was taken, to be fair. There was no argument based on the European Convention
in the Kearley case, but if, as in Kearley, the prosecution case relies heavily on
the statements of declarants whom the defense are never given the opportunity to
question, then the Strasbourg jurisprudence would seem to question whether
such evidence should be used to find a conviction.8 At the very least it would
seem that the prosecution needs to prove that questioning by the defense was
genuinely impossible. Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act pro-
vides a useful mechanism for ensuring that, whatever changes are made to the
hearsay rule, the United Kingdom is able to fulfill its international obligation to
conform in its domestic law with the Convention's terms and principles.
3. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
4. SIR RUPERT CROSS & COLIN LAPPER, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 717 (7th ed. 1990).
5. Id.
6. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 78 (Eng.).
7. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. RE. 25, 31 (1995).
8. Alex Stein states in his correspondence of July 28 that he is more pessimistic than me about the impact
of the European Convention. See Alex Stein, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay
Rule: How Would (or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case, 16 MIss. C. L. RE. 193 (1995)
(responding to John Jackson). But he acknowledges in a later reply to Craig Callen's query about Ludi v.
Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1992), that the European Court has recognized some sort of
confrontation right but a "weak and truncated confrontation right, which, in addition, is always subject to bal-
ancing." Alex Stein, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 194, 195 (1995) (responding to
Craig R. Callen). The Strasbourg jurisprudence is still developing in relation to hearsay. There have been a
number of recent decisions (see, in addition to Ludi v. Switzerland, Saidi v. France, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 251
(1994)) and the position is by no means clear, but it does seem that a principle is emerging whereby hearsay





A few points concerning John Jackson's recent contribution to the Symposium:'
As he acknowledges, under the new Law Commission's proposal, hearsay
problems will not disappear with the relaxation of the hearsay rules. They will
simply be relocated from one doctrinal framework (the traditional hearsay doc-
trine) to another (section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act,2 authoriz-
ing courts to exclude any evidence, if its admission leads to unfairness of the
proceedings).
The confrontation issue will thus have to be dealt with under section 78, which
is not new? Similarly, section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, provides
that documentary hearsay admissible, in principle, under this Act, can be exclud-
ed as a matter of discretion, which should be exercised by considering, inter alia,
"whether it is likely to be possible to controvert the statement."4 Hence, the con-
frontation right is there and cannot, in my view, be denied merely because the
judge believes that the disputed statement is creditworthy. This obviously applies
to implied assertions. If this discretion is properly exercised, statements such as
those dealt with in Regina v. Kearley5 would be excluded anyway under section
78. The Law Lords majority supports this observation by justifying its decision
not only doctrinally, but also on the merits.
I am even more pessimistic than John about the impact of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Article 6 (3)(d) of this Convention seemingly guarantees a confrontation right,6
but if one looks at the Strasbourg judgments, then that does not appear to hold
true.'. I stopped looking at these judgments (which also did not strike me as well-
reasoned) in 1992. But I doubt that there are new developments. In 1992, I
spoke informally with one of the judges and he told me that interpretation of
Article 6 should be consonant with the Continental notion of "free proof." To
reiterate what I said previously in responding to Ron Allen: the key question is
not how to define hearsay, but what rights the defendant should have. If his/her
confrontation right is to be taken seriously, then all kinds of hearsay should be
excluded in the absence of a functionally equivalent substitute to cross-examina-
tion.' In civil trials, where plaintiffs' and defendants' wrongful losses are equally
bad, there is generally no need for an exclusionary rule such as hearsay.
1. See John Jackson, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 191 (1995).
2. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (Eng.).
3. See Regina v. O'Loughlin, 3 All E.R. 431 (C.C.C. 1988) (out-of-court depositions admissible, in princi-
ple, under Criminal Justice Act (1925), section 13, excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act). See also Scott v. Regina, 2 All E.R. 305, 313 (P.C. 1989), which somewhat qualified the ruling
in O'Loughlin.
4. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, Section 25 (2)(d) (Eng.).
5. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
6. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 6 (3)(d)
(1950), as amended September 21, 1970, and December 20, 1971.
7. See, e.g., Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (1986) (defendant's wife and step-daughter
invoked the relatives' privilege and were exempted from testifying against him; their statements to the police
have, however, been admitted as direct evidence of defendant's guilt); X v. Belgium, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 200
(1979) (incriminating statement made to the police by an UNIDENTIFIED (!!!) informer admissible to prove
its truth).
8. See Eleanor Swift, A Foundation FactApproach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1339 (1987).
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Craig R. Callen
July 28
In his last message, Alex expressed doubts that the European Convention
includes a confrontation right. He said:
I am even more pessimistic than John about the impact of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Article 6(3)(d) of this Convention seemingly guarantees confrontation right, but
if one looks at the Strasbourg judgments, then .... [deletion of discussion of
some judgments] I stopped looking at these judgments (which also did not strike
me as well-reasoned) in 1992. But I doubt that there are new developments. In
1992, I spoke informally with one of the judges and he told me that interpreta-
tion of Article 6 should be consonant with the Continental notion of "free
proof."
1
As a query to Alex (John Jackson's system is down until the 1 st) or anyone else
familiar with the European Court's decisions: Doesn't Ludi v. Switzerland2 seem
to recognize some sort of confrontation norm?
Alex Stein
July 31
Here is my response to Craig's query:
Craig Callen wrote: "As a query to Alex (John Jackson's system is down until
the 1st) or anyone else familiar with the European Court's decisions: Doesn't
Ludi v. Switzerland seem to recognize some sort of confrontation norm?"2
In this case, an undercover agent, who was a police officer, was exempted from
testifying and his statements were admitted against the accused. The accused
was not allowed to subpoena the agent. The Strasbourg Court ruled that unlike
anonymous police informers whose lives/limbs may be threatened if forced to
testify, the present agent was a police officer already known to the accused.
Therefore, ON THE BALANCE, he should have been allowed to be called and
1. Alex Stein, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 193 (1995) (responding to John
Jackson).
2. 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1992).
1. 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1992).
2. Craig R. Callen, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 194 (1995) (responding to Alex
Stein).
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examined as a witness. The Swiss court's decision to the contrary violated
Article 6 (3)(d).3
This does contain some sort of confrontation norm, namely, a weak and trun-
cated confrontation right, which - in addition - is always subject to balancing.
3. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 6 (3)(d)
(1950), as amended September 21, 1970, and December 20, 1971.

